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ABSTRACT 
 
Environmental taxes are argued to be the key to more effective environmental protection in devel-
oping countries. This paper investigates whether such taxes have the necessary public support to be 
successfully implemented in different contexts, including countries outside the Western and Euro-
pean spheres. Applying a multilevel analysis approach, using data from the World Values Survey and 
International Social Survey Programme, interaction effects between values, political and social trust, 
and perceived quality of government (QoG) are explored. It is hypothesized that if people lack trust 
in public authorities to implement green taxes in an efficient, fair and uncorrupt manner, they will be 
less likely to support such taxes despite their strong pro-environmental values or trust in other people. 
The results show that people holding green values are more likely to support environmental taxes if 
they live in countries with high levels of QoG. Moreover, the effect of social trust on support for 
green taxes appears to be contingent on individual-level political trust rather than the quality of gov-
ernment institutions. These interactions need further exploration since they vary across countries and 
datasets. While support for environmental taxes is found to be relatively high in some developing 
countries, public aversion towards higher taxes for environmental protection is still relatively high 
internationally.  
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Introduction 
Environmental problems in the form of climate change, environmental degradation of air, water and 
soil, as well as depletion of common pool resources such as fish stocks, timber and coal, are by many 
scholars perceived to be rooted in social dilemmas, or lack of collective action. Since the costs of 
polluting activities are shared by everyone collectively, while the benefits are received by each actor 
individually, there is a strong incentive for individuals to free-ride (or defect). That is, to benefit from 
emission reductions taken by others, and engage in activities that generate environmental pollution 
or overuse of natural resources instead of acting pro-environmentally and cooperate for the common 
good. In other words, the short-term benefits of individuals acting in an environmentally harmful 
manner tend to outweigh the long-term losses of everyone collectively – restricting cooperative be-
havior (Olson 1971; Ostrom 1990; Dawes 1980; Kollock 1998). Therefore, some kind of steering 
instruments from an external authority such as the state are needed since voluntary cooperation is 
not likely to come about easily (Mansbridge 2014; see also Palfrey & Rosenthal 1984; Saijo & Yamato 
1999; Okada 1993; Dixit & Olson 2000).  
Today, regular citizens’ consumption patterns are argued to be the main sources of pollution respon-
sible for environmental degradation rather than the activities of “big polluters” in the fossil fuel in-
dustry (Maniates 2001; Skill 2008; Micheletti 2003; Matti 2009). According to several environmental 
economists and policy experts, taxes are one of the most efficient policy tools to deal with today’s 
environmental problems and change people’s behavior from an economic perspective (Tietenberg 
1990; Kallbekken & Aasen 2010; Sterner 2012). These market-based instruments have been advo-
cated by various policy advisors and donors, including international organizations like the World 
Bank and OECD (OECD 2016) for many years, arguing that environmental taxes are the key to more 
effective environmental protection in developing countries (Coria & Sterner 2010). Whether such 
taxes are a suitable solution in different country contexts, and if people in these countries are actually 
willing to accept and pay higher taxes for environmental protection is one of the main interests of 
this paper.              
Environmental taxes have been proven to work well as policy tools to reduce environmentally harm-
ful behavior in many contexts – particularly in developed countries in the Western and European 
spheres. However, in many cases environmental taxes are not imposed, and where they are imposed 
their design often differs from recommendations of economists (Kallbekken & Aasen 2010). There 
are several important reasons for this; public attitudes are one of them, especially when it comes to 
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taxes that are imposed directly on individuals (Kallbekken 2008). It is important to understand public 
attitudes towards environmental taxes because in order to design taxes such that they are politically 
feasible, they need to be both effective and considered acceptable among the public (Kallbekken & 
Aasen 2010). While extensive research on public support for green taxes has been conducted mainly 
in developed countries within the European or Western parts of the world (e.g. Hammar & Jagers 
2006; Kallbekken & Sælen 2011; Kallbekken & Aasen 2010; Harring & Jagers 2013; Harring 2014a; 
Konisky et al. 2008; Clinch & Dunne 2006; Deroubaix & Leveque 2004; Dresner et al. 2006; Jagers 
& Hammar 2009; Alm & Torgler 2006), there appears to be a lack of comparative research that 
includes countries outside these contexts (Harring 2016; Kollmann & Reichl 2013; Harring & 
Lapuente 2016 are a few exceptions).     
Given that previous research has shown that corruption, and political and social trust, matters for 
people’s attitudes towards environmental taxes (see e.g. Hammar & Jagers 2006; Harring 2014a; Har-
ring & Jagers 2013; Harring 2013; Kallbekken & Sælen 2011; Kollmann & Reichl 2013), such taxes 
could be expected not to work as properly in developing countries in Africa, Asia, South America or 
Latin America where levels of corruption are usually higher. In fact, studies have shown that people 
in corrupt countries (generating low trust in government and in other people) have a lower tax-mo-
rale2; causing low compliance with public policies and demands for stricter regulations instead (Frey 
& Torgler 2007; Aghion et al. 2010). Thus, the level of quality of government appears to matter not 
only for effective implementation, but also for public demand for state policies before the policies 
are implemented in the first place.   
Environmental taxes may have been efficient in many developed countries, but implementing this 
category of policy tools in developing countries or emerging economies can meet various obstacles 
and public resistance for different reasons. While previous research has investigated a range of ex-
planatory factors, including social trust, political trust, economic and political factors, ideological 
preferences, sense of fairness, environmental concern, values, beliefs and social and personal norms 
to explain support for green taxes and other climate policies (see Drews & Van den Bergh 2015 for 
overview), none or at least very few studies have looked at potential interaction effects (Fairbrother 
2016 and Harring & Lapuente 2016 are two exceptions). This might be a reason why the existing 
                                                   
2 A term that is often used when referring to individual's intrinsic willingness to pay taxes (Alm & Torgler 2006).  
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literature has been unable to identify what factors matter the most in explaining public attitudes to-
wards environmental taxes, and more importantly whether the same factors apply similarly in differ-
ent country contexts.3  
Fairbrother (2016), investigating support for environmental protection, finds that the effects of social 
trust and political trust vary cross-nationally, but does not provide any explanations. By exploring 
interactions, we can discover whether some factors matter more in certain contexts, and why this is 
the case. There are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the effects of people’s values and 
trust vary across countries, depending on institutional context. In this paper, it is argued that the 
effects of people’s green values and social trust on environmental tax support is contingent on the 
perceived quality of government (QoG): If people do not trust public authorities to implement taxes 
in an efficient and uncorrupt manner, they are likely to be less supportive of the taxes despite their 
pro-environmental values or trust in other people. Exploring these relationships is crucial for the 
successful and effective implementation of climate policies, if green taxes will be increasingly imposed 
internationally to enhance climate change mitigation and prevent large-scale environmental degrada-
tion. It is also important from a political science perspective since successful policies can increase 
satisfaction with and trust in political leaders, creating an environment where leaders can succeed 
(Hetherington 1998).                    
The aim of this paper is to explore potential interaction effects between individual-level and country-
level variables that can contribute to findings from previous research and help explain public support 
for environmental taxes internationally. Assuming that interactions are possible and that the impacts 
of individual-level factors are contingent on other individual- or country-level factors, could lead to 
other conclusions about their importance in different country contexts. Exploring interactions will 
contribute to broaden our understanding of the effects of factors that have been identified as crucial 
for public support of environmental taxes including values and trust. Political and social trust have 
mainly been studied separately in previous research, while people’s value orientation has not received 
much attention in the literature on trust and policy acceptance (Harring & Jager 2013 and Konisky 
et al. 2008 are two rare exceptions). This paper brings two large literatures together; the environmen-
tal psychology literature on values and the political-sociological literature on trust.   
                                                   
3 Drews and Van den Bergh (2015) refer to the relative importance of factors as a question left unanswered in their review 
of existing research and highlight that little is known about the effects in other geographical areas and cultural contexts 
(other than in Europe, North America and Australia).  
  6 
The overarching research question asked is: Do the effects of values and social trust on public sup-
port for environmental taxes vary depending on country context? Specifically, does QoG explain this 
variation? In order to investigate the contingent effects, data from the Fifth Wave (2005-2009) of the 
World Values Survey (WVS) and the Survey Environment III (2010) from the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP) is used. These two datasets are used partly as a robustness check to see if 
we find similar effects, and to be able to investigate whether different operationalizations of the main 
variables of interest matters for the results. The main interest of the study is not to investigate country 
effects, rather to see whether differences in individual-level relationships across countries are deter-
mined by contextual factors. For these purposes a multilevel analysis approach is used.     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides a short background to 
environmental taxes and the importance of public support. The third section provides the theoretical 
framework and literature review, leading to the theoretical models and hypotheses. The fourth section 
discusses the methodological approach, the data and operationalizations of variables. The fifth sec-
tion discusses the limitations of the study. The sixth section provides the results of the analysis, and 
in the seventh section the results are analyzed and related to the hypotheses and theoretical models. 
The final section concludes by returning to the research question and aim of the paper and provides 
some suggestions for future research.        
Environmental taxes and why public support4 matters   
The use of market-based economic instruments such as environmental taxes, permit schemes and 
subsidies as policy tools to reduce environmentally harmful behavior of both individuals and busi-
nesses has been common for the past decades mainly in developed countries around the world, but 
they have also been implemented in numerous developing countries in Asia, South America, Latin 
America and most recently in Africa – especially in the form of taxes (Bluffstone 2003; Sterner 2012). 
These policy instruments are considered to be more efficient than traditional command-and-control 
measures, such as legislation or coercive regulations, in dealing with environmental degradation and 
pollution of today (Connelly et al. 2012; see also Tietenberg 1990; Sterner 2012). The latter measures 
are still considered the dominant tools in environmental policy, while the former are mainly discussed 
                                                   
4 In this paper, support and acceptance are used interchangeably. They are defined in terms of attitudes, and partly 
measured as willingness to pay for environmental protection. An attitude is commonly defined as “a psychological ten-
dency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken 1993). 
In this case, it is the evaluation of environmental taxes in general and to what degree people agree or disagree with taxes 
as policy tools for environmental protection.    
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in terms of distributional effects and influences on competitiveness in the market (OECD 2006, 2010, 
in Kollmann & Reichl 2013). It is argued, however, that there has been an increased focus on design-
ing efficient, incentive-based pro-environmental policy tools directly targeted at the behaviors of in-
dividuals (Harring 2014b). This is seen as a result of a general shift in interpretation of the responsi-
bility for causes of environmental problems as well as the best way to solve these problems. Eco-
nomic instruments are often considered a universal solution to environmental collective action prob-
lems, and environmental taxes are one such popular solution. However, in many countries their use 
is still relatively limited (OECD 2016).       
An environmental tax or a “green” tax is considered to be a market-based push-strategy aimed at 
increasing the price of environmentally harmful activities and changing people’s behavior. The for-
mer is done by internalizing environmental and social costs (externalities) caused by polluting activi-
ties into market transactions. As such, green taxes are argued to help correct for the market failures 
that cause environmental problems by attaching a price to polluting activities, that is equal to the 
damages caused by these activities (Endres & Radke 2012). The logic behind imposing the tax is that 
as the price for certain activities increases, people’s incentive to change their behavior in a more 
sustainable direction will also increase (Harring & Jagers 2013; Harring 2014a). The argument, based 
on economic theory, is that imposing taxes on polluting activities will reduce environmental damage 
in the most efficient way, by encouraging households and firms that can reduce pollution at the lowest 
cost to change their behavior (OECD 2010). The efficiency criterion alone might not be a reason 
enough for policymakers to adopt green taxes, however. It is argued that public preferences towards 
such policies are at least as important as economic efficiency (Brännlund & Persson 2012).     
In many contexts, there has been strong opposition against these kinds of policy tools. In the process 
of designing policy tools, decision-makers often face a challenge in striking the right balance between 
what is perceived efficient by policy experts and what is perceived legitimate by the public. Both the 
level and direction of public support for a certain policy instrument can have major implications for 
its following performance (Matti 2009). Moreover, unless there is sufficient public support for a sug-
gested policy tool it is not likely to be advocated within the political arena and will therefore fail to 
be implemented (Page & Shapiro 1983). Thus, policies that reflect public preferences are more likely 
to become efficient when, or if, they are implemented in practice (Brännlund & Persson 2012). For 
these very reasons, it is important for policymakers to understand which factors influence public 
attitudes towards (environmental) policies in general and environmental taxes in particular. This can 
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help reveal under what conditions taxes are considered legitimate to the public, making them politi-
cally feasible (see Kallbekken & Aasen 2011). In some contexts, green taxes may not be politically 
feasible, however, considering the effects of individual- and country-level factors. Moreover, some 
economists have argued that green taxes will not work as well in developing countries compared to 
in developed countries due to institutional and economic constraints limiting the ability of regulators 
to monitor compliance and/or punish violations of imposed measures (Blackman & Harrington 
2000; Bell & Russell 2002, in Coria et al. 2011).  
 
Theoretical framework and literature review 
Social dilemmas and willingness to pay taxes for environmental protection 
Environmental protection, or the provision of a clean and healthy environment, is considered a pub-
lic good and can be described in terms of first-order and second-order social dilemmas or free-riding 
problems (Ostrom 1998; Kollock 1998; Berigan & Irwin 2011; Oliver 1980; Yamagishi 1986; Okada 
2008). The first-order dilemma occurs when individuals choose not to cooperate and solve the public 
good provision problem and engage in activities that are harmful to the environment instead. Volun-
tary actions that will provide for environmental protection are not likely, particularly in large-scale 
collective action dilemmas, and those actions that are taken by individuals, households and firms are 
not adequate, since they will undersupply pollution abatement if the individual costs of such efforts 
exceed the benefits enjoyed by themselves and others (Fairbrother 2016). In order to induce actors 
to undertake more substantial efforts, organized coordination or sanctioning systems provided by a 
third, external party such as the government is needed. Implementing policies aimed at changing 
actors’ behavior and overcoming the original social dilemma can cause a second-order social di-
lemma. The second-order dilemma occurs when individuals refuse to comply with policies or sanc-
tioning systems imposed by the state. If the sanctions or costs of non-compliance are low, actors 
might choose to enjoy the collective benefits while simultaneously ignoring to pay a tax or comply 
with a set regulation (Harring 2014b).  
This division between first-order and second-order dilemmas is captured by Ostrom’s (1990) concept 
polycentrism, saying that decision-making by individuals at the local level needs to be “nested” within 
state structures at a higher level. This higher level provides the necessary tools or resources to make 
local negotiations on common-pool resources efficient. State action at the higher level is argued to 
be an often necessary solution to complex collective action problems, including the provision of 
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public goods.5 One of the state functions is to threaten to impose a solution if local negotiating parties 
fail to reach an agreement. Mansbridge (2014) takes things a step further by arguing that today there 
is a need for state-like overarching institutions at the international level, due to issues such as climate 
change and environmental degradation taking place at large scales. These overarching institutions 
should, according to Mansbridge, provide state-like functions to facilitate efficient cooperation on a 
level where one state with legitimate coercion power does not exist. The take-home point is that 
voluntary cooperation to protect the environment is not likely to come about easily, rather some kind 
of strong external authority is needed.  
From an individual’s perspective, costly abatement efforts are only meaningful when they are out-
weighed by equivalent contributions made by others, but such contributions can never be guaranteed. 
Instead of taking part in collective actions for environmental protection actors, including individuals, 
firms and households, might choose to cheat through violating costly regulations or avoid paying a 
pollution tax (UNEP 2004, in Fairbrother 2016). So why then would individuals, or other actors, be 
willing to pay taxes to provide a public good despite it (i.e. environmental protection) being costly to 
them? Contrary to the beliefs of rational-choice theorists that individuals’ actions are motivated 
purely by their own self-interests, others have argued that individuals are not self-interested but rather 
strong reciprocators (Fehr et al. 2002; Gintis 2000; Gintis et al. 2003). They are willing to sacrifice 
resources in order to be kind to those who are being kind and to punish those who do not obey by 
the rules and being unkind. The former is referred to as “strong positive reciprocity” and the latter is 
referred to as “strong negative reciprocity”. Assuming that most people are strong positive recipro-
cators, we might come to understand why people are willing to pay higher taxes to provide a public 
good even if it is costly to them. The benefits provided to participants of any system that is designed 
for protecting the environment will depend on the probability of compliance by others, which in turn 
will depend partly on the quality of how the system is being enforced (Fairbrother 2016). Put differ-
ently, individuals will pay taxes for environmental protection if they believe that other individuals will 
pay their fair share (i.e. if the level of social trust is high), and if they believe that the taxes will be 
managed efficiently and fairly by the government implementing the taxes (i.e. if the level of political 
trust is high) (Scholz & Lubell 1998; Svallfors 2013).6   
                                                   
5 This is Mansbridge’s (2014) interpretation of Ostrom’s argument about state action.  
6 Important to note is that Scholz and Lubell, and Svallfors (and Rothstein and Uslaner 2005 below) discuss tax compli-
ance or support for taxes in general, and not compliance with environmental taxes specifically. 
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The problem of a second-order dilemma could be considered to be more severe in countries where 
levels of social trust is low and taxes can be more easily evaded, that is, where levels of QoG are low. 
In a country like Sweden, for example, where the level of QoG is high it would be nearly impossible 
for people to cheat on fuel taxes and other taxes related to consumption patterns considering how 
the tax-system is designed and enforced. If there is low social trust in these contexts people might 
demand more policies since they believe in the state capacity to enforce the tax-system and punish 
free-riders. In high QoG countries, it is more likely that people will comply with imposed policies 
and that implementing authorities will provide something good by, for example, putting the revenues 
from taxes to their rightful use. In low QoG countries, on the other hand, this is less likely largely 
because of high corruption levels. Moreover, economic and institutional constraints in these coun-
tries can contribute to overall poor enforcement of tax-systems by government authorities. Investi-
gating public support for environmental taxes in low QoG countries is of crucial importance since 
the implementation of bad reforms in these contexts can result in even more corruption (e.g. Dama-
nia 2002).  
The context or social structure in which people live has been argued to be crucially important for 
people’s tendency to engage in cooperation or not, and it can be argued to be of similar importance 
when it comes to policy acceptance. To get the support of individuals to pay taxes for environmental 
protection, there is a need for relatively high levels of both social trust and political trust in the soci-
eties they live in (Scholz & Lubell 1998; Rothstein & Uslaner 2005). I will elaborate further on both 
these types of trust, and the importance of people’s values, in the following sub-sections. At this 
point it is enough to say that reciprocity, social trust, and political trust (including confidence in 
government quality) appear to be important incentives for individuals to refrain from free-riding and 
engage in cooperative behavior, as well as to comply with taxes for environmental protection.  
     
Previous research: theories, findings and shortcomings 
In this section, the theories on the importance of social trust, political trust and people’s value orien-
tation for public acceptance of green taxes are discussed, and some findings of previous research 
presented. In addition, gaps in existing research are identified that open up for more elaborate studies 
on the effects of values and social trust in relation to QoG.        
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Social trust as a determining factor of public support and QoG  
Generalized social trust in other people, or interpersonal trust, is considered an important factor in 
order for people to solve collective action problems and engage in cooperative behavior (Ostrom 
1998), as well as for people’s willingness to comply with different policy measures aimed at dealing 
with collective action problems (Janoski 1998; Uslaner 2003, in Hammar & Jagers 2006). Sønderskov 
(2009) argues that generalized social trust7 helps in solving large-scale collective action problems, 
since people’s propensity to cooperate largely depends on whether they trust most other actors in-
volved in the social dilemma to cooperate as well. Testing the theory his analysis shows that general-
ized social trust has a strong positive effect on public good provision, but not in a joint product 
situation8, indicating that social trust enhances cooperation in collective action dilemmas in particular. 
If people in fact decided to act collectively and protect the environment from polluting activities, 
there would be no need for government intervention and less need for different policies such as taxes 
to try to change people’s behavior. Social trust can thereby indirectly explain attitudes towards envi-
ronmental policy instruments, since they impact actions taken collectively by individuals to protect 
the environment (Harring 2014b). If people cannot agree to act collectively, or if they do not trust 
most other actors to cooperate for the common good, they are likely to support some kind of policy 
instrument that is imposed by the state.   
While low trust in others to cooperate and engage in activities for environmental protection could 
generate demand for environmental taxes, low social trust in others to comply with the taxes gener-
ates less support for taxes. If people feel that their fellow citizens are dishonest and do not believe 
that other people will comply with an environmental tax, they are less likely to support such a tax 
(Harring & Jagers 2013). Hammar and others (2009), for example, find in their study that people’s 
tendency to accept higher taxes for environmental protection depends on the degree to which tax-
evasion is possible. The more difficult it is to escape from paying the taxes, the more willing people 
are to accept them. This leads us to the importance of QoG and its relationship with social trust and 
collective action. QoG is argued to generate trust (social and political trust) and hence, cooperation. 
Some argue that citizens trust each other since they perceive the state as a credible enforcer of con-
tracts (e.g. Offe 1999; see also Levi & Stoker 2000). Others argue that citizens who perceive public 
                                                   
7 Refers to trust in people one does not generally know (i.e. not trust in friends, family members or relatives).   
8  Sønderskov tests his hypothesis that generalized social trust has a larger effect in collective action dilemmas which 
involve a pure public good (recycling), against a joint product situation (consumption of organic foods) that involves both 
private and public benefits.    
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employees as trustworthy also believe that most people are trustworthy (e.g. Rothstein & Stolle 2008). 
QoG implies that public authorities such as courts and the police will enforce government law incor-
ruptly, impartially and efficiently. As such, the risk of being cheated by others will be lower, since 
people believe in the competence of public institutions to punish those who try to cheat while loop-
holes within the system (allowing for tax-evasion and corrupt practices) are minimized, which in turn 
increases trust. It has been shown by, for example, Hammar and others that the lower trust people 
have in their fellow citizens, the stronger is their belief that taxes are being systematically evaded 
(Hammar et al. 2009).        
From this, we can expect people with higher social trust to be more supportive of higher taxes to 
protect the environment, but we could also ask whether social trust has different effects in different 
country contexts. That is, in contexts with varying levels of QoG. Keeping in mind that QoG is 
believed to generate higher levels of social and political trust, it could also be argued that the effect 
of social trust on public support for green taxes is contingent on the quality of government institu-
tions. Aghion et al. (2010), for example, show that people living in corrupt countries are more likely 
to support strict legal regulations, which is explained by a lack of trust in other actors to voluntary 
contribute to public goods provision. It is reasonable to believe that the same applies to environmen-
tal taxes; people with low levels of social trust will demand more taxes only in high QoG countries 
where the state is perceived as a credible enforcer (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya 2013). In contexts with low 
social trust they are more likely to support strict legal environmental regulations instead.      
A different interaction effect could also exist when it comes to acceptance of green taxes. I would 
argue that social trust will have a stronger positive effect on public support for green taxes in high 
QoG countries. Instead of demanding regulations people will be more open to taxes, due to higher 
levels of social and political trust (see next sub-section). People who live in countries with low levels 
of QoG or trust in implementing institutions are not likely to be supportive of higher taxes to protect 
the environment, since they can believe that tax-revenues will be wasted or stolen following corrupt 
practices, or that the tax-system has been designed with loopholes allowing for tax-evasion or unfair 
tax-loadings (Fairbrother 2016). If this is the case, people’s general trust in others should not even 
matter because even if they trust others to comply with the taxes the money can still be wasted by 
corrupt and unreliable government officials. From this, we would expect social trust to have a 
stronger positive effect on public support for environmental taxes in countries with high levels of 
QoG.        
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Political and institutional trust9 as a determining factor of public support and QoG   
The way people perceive political institutions that implement policies to steer their behavior is im-
portant for all kinds of pro-environmental policy instruments used, regardless of whether it concerns 
regulations, information or economic incentives (Harring 2014a). Although people might have very 
strong green sympathies or concern for the environment, they can still choose to refuse to accept 
pro-environmental policy instruments. People’s attitudes towards political steering and their view of 
the authorities that are implementing the specific policy instrument also matter for people’s willing-
ness to accept pro-environmental, political initiatives (Hammar & Jagers 2006; Harring & Jagers 
2013). There is an extensive literature on how political trust, or QoG, affects public support for state 
intervention where it is argued that people’s perceptions of public officials as uncorrupt, efficient and 
fair explains attitudes towards redistribution, taxes and government spending (Svallfors 2013; Heth-
erington 1998; Scholz & Lubell 1998; Rothstein et al. 2012; Rudolph & Evans 2005).  
Svallfors (2013), investigating attitudes towards higher taxes and government spending, finds that 
people’s perceptions of the effectiveness and fairness of government officials has a strong independ-
ent effect on such attitudes. He shows that support for welfare and redistribution policies is stronger 
in countries with high levels of QoG. People who live in societies with low levels of QoG, however, 
may not believe that the government and public administration have the capacity or necessary bu-
reaucratic discretion required to carry out certain policies or reforms. It is argued that policies requir-
ing more bureaucratic discretion and government capacity, such as complex market-based policy 
tools (including taxes), are less likely to be imposed by governments in corrupt countries, partly since 
the level of QoG affects public support for these policies (Dahlström et al. 2013). At low levels of 
QoG, people might be unsure of how revenues will be spent or believe that they will be wasted due 
to inefficiency and corrupt practices. This, following how the issue is framed, can be related to polit-
ical trust or institutional trust at the individual level or perceptions of QoG at the country level.               
Market-based policies and reforms in particular have been argued to be contingent on rule-based and 
well-functioning bureaucracies, in order to build trust between various actors (e.g. individuals and 
businesses) and to enhance the predictability in market transactions (Pierre & Rothstein 2011). Fur-
thermore, it has been argued that unless there is a rule-based, trustworthy public administration in 
                                                   
9 Institutional trust is defined as trust in the effectiveness and fairness of public institutions (Rothstein 2005) and is used 
interchangeably with the term political trust in this paper.     
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place, people will not support implementation of taxes10 despite their strong pro-environmental be-
liefs (Harring 2014b). For example, people might believe that public administrators engage in arbi-
trary enforcement and impose greater compliance costs on some polluters, but not on others. Poli-
cymakers could also have designed a system that allows certain individuals to escape their tax-obliga-
tions, or they might end up using tax-revenues for corrupt practices instead (Fairbrother 2016). Re-
search has to some extent confirmed these arguments by showing that corrupt political institutions 
generate aversion towards economic incentives (e.g. Harring 2016), and several studies have found 
that in countries with corrupt and inefficient public institutions there is a strong demand for regula-
tions instead (Aghion et al. 2010; Di Tella & MacCulloch 2009; Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. 2011; Pinotti 
2011). In this case, people’s desire to punish free-riders with regulations that are strong and coercive 
seems to outweigh concern about public officials being corrupt.  
Other research shows that there will be less aversion towards market-based instruments and redis-
tributive policies if the state is perceived as a credible enforcer. This will make the need for regulations 
smaller and open up for more complex policies such as taxes, since the ability of the state to punish 
possible free-riders is considered credible (i.e. free-riding is less likely) and political trust and social 
trust is higher (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya 2013).11 From this, we would expect people in high QoG coun-
tries to be more supportive of taxes for environmental protection, due to generally higher levels of 
political and social trust in these societies.      
The importance of political trust for public attitudes towards environmental policy tools has been 
confirmed by the findings in many studies that have looked at public attitudes towards market-based 
policy instruments, including taxes (e.g. Hammar & Jagers 2006; Hammar et al. 2009; Harring & 
Jagers 2013; Kallbekken & Aasen 2010; Kallbekken et al. 2013; Kallbekken & Sælen 2011; Deroubaix 
& Leveque 2004; Dresner et al. 2006; Clinch & Dune 2006; Matti 2009; Kollmann & Reichl 2013; 
Fairbrother 2016). These studies have found that people with higher levels of political trust are gen-
erally more supportive of environmental taxes. If people do not believe in the competence of politi-
cians to recognize whether taxes are the right option for climate change mitigation, or if they question 
whether revenues from taxes will be spent in an effective and appropriate manner, they will not be 
                                                   
10 Or other market-based or redistributive policies, as is explicitly stated by Harring (2014b). 
11 One usual assumption is that in countries where levels of QoG are high, social and political trust is also high. The latter 
two are often considered to be a product of QoG, while a few scholars have argued for the reverse.   
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able to accept an increase in taxes to protect the environment (Hammar & Jagers 2006, in Harring & 
Jagers 2013).    
Pro-environmental value orientation12 as a determining factor of public support and QoG 
There is an existing literature on people’s value orientation that has received attention from several 
scholars when trying to explain the acceptance of environmental policy instruments. This particular 
branch of research usually departs from Schwartz’s value scheme (Schwartz 1992), from which the 
value-belief-norm (VBN) theory or chain has developed (Stern et al. 1999), or Inglehart’s post-mate-
rialist values scale (Inglehart 1995).  
Scholars in previous research have measured people’s values using Schwartz’s value scheme as part 
of capturing the components of the VBN chain. The VBN theory has mainly been used within the 
field of environmental psychology, to help explain people’s general environmental attitudes or be-
haviors, why they join environmental movements, concerns for environmental problems, and their 
willingness to make sacrifices for environmental protection (Hansla et al. 2008; Poortinga et al. 2004; 
Stern et al. 1999; Schultz & Zelezny 1999). Following the VBN theory13, scholars have argued that 
holding different values (e.g. egoistic or altruistic values) creates certain beliefs about environmental 
conditions that affect the formation of attitudes in general and attitudes towards environmental policy 
tools. Supportive evidence of the theory can be found in many studies focusing on various pro-
environmental actions, including pro-environmental policy acceptance (e.g. Schuitema et al. 2011; 
Steg et al. 2005; Hansla et al. 2013; Eriksson et al. 2006).    
Other scholars have measured people’s values using Inglehart’s post-materialist values scale14 (Kidd 
& Lee 1997; Franzen & Meyer 2010; Gelissen 2007; Inglehart 1995; see also Brechin & Kempton 
1997; Dunlap & Mertig 1997; Abramson 1997; Pierce 1997). It is assumed that values affect people’s 
general environmental concern, and therefore their acceptance of pro-environmental policy tools. 
This literature takes the distinction made between materialist and post-materialist values as a point of 
departure. The former emphasize economic well-being and national security, and the latter emphasize 
quality of life and self-expression as important for a society (Stern et al. 1999). The theory of post-
                                                   
12 Refers to post-materialist values and is used interchangeably with environmental values in this paper.   
13 See, for example, Stern (1999) to learn more about the VBN theory.  
14 The post-materialist scale has not been used to measure values in relation to the VBN theory.   
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materialism holds that post-materialist political and social values and attitudes have emerged in in-
dustrialized (Western or European) countries, resulting from an increase in affluence and security. 
According to Inglehart, people (or initially generations) have developed different values that can be 
explained by their life experiences. Those who have experienced material insecurity develop materi-
alist values, and those who have not develop post-materialist values or priorities like environmental 
protection (Inglehart 1971, 1977). While it is important to highlight that increased post-materialism 
in societies is not only about development of pro-environmental values15, post-materialist values have 
been found to be directly related to support for environmental protection internationally, measured 
as willingness to make economic sacrifices for the environment (Gelissen 2007).   
Values can be considered as the root of people’s attitudes. Attitudes are formed through people’s 
personal norms, which in turn can be seen as derived from environmental values (Nordlund & Garvill 
2002). From these values certain beliefs about environmental conditions are created, which can affect 
people’s attitudes towards environmental taxes.16 The existing literature has not looked at potential 
interactions when evaluating this effect, however. It could be argued that the effect of values on 
public support for taxes varies across country contexts.17 Svallfors (2013), investigating public atti-
tudes towards higher taxes and government spending, finds that the effects of people’s egalitarian 
values (i.e. their beliefs in equality for all people) is contingent on perceived effectiveness and fairness 
of government institutions. He shows that the effect of such values is stronger in countries with high 
levels of QoG, and that people with egalitarian values are generally more supportive of higher taxes 
and spending. At low levels of QoG, his study shows that people with egalitarian values in some 
cases want lower taxes than people with less egalitarian values. That is, people with egalitarian values 
that are usually supportive of welfare and distribution policies are not prepared to support such pol-
icies if they live in low QoG societies.  
If the same holds true for people’s pro-environmental values, we can expect the positive effect of 
post-materialist values to be stronger in countries with high levels of QoG. We could also expect 
people with green values to support environmental taxes only if there is a trustworthy public admin-
istration in place. As indicated by Svallfors study, and translated to this context, green values could 
                                                   
15 It also affects, for example, political tolerance, racial attitudes and political participation (see Davis 2000).  
16 Environmental values are considered to be linked to altruistic values, and contrary to egoistic values. People holding 
altruistic or environmental values are expected to be more positive towards such policy instruments.    
17 Pierce (1997), for example, stresses the importance of taking into account political culture within countries when eval-
uating the effect of post-materialist values on environmental concern.   
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have a negative effect on public support for environmental taxes in low QoG contexts. In this case, 
QoG would be expected to convert green values into support.       
Theoretical models and hypotheses 
The literature review and theoretical discussion above highlights the possibility of interaction effects. 
Based on the findings in previous research and theoretical arguments, we could expect the effects of 
social trust and values to vary across country contexts. That is, across countries with varying levels 
of QoG. QoG is suggested to be a moderator that impacts the relationship between pro-environ-
mental values and public support for environmental taxes. QoG is also expected to moderate the 
impact of social trust on environmental tax support. Political and social trust are assumed to be af-
fected by QoG, and they are all expected to have direct effects on public support for environmental 
taxes. The relationships are illustrated in figures 1 and 2.  
FIGURE 1. PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES, QOG, SOCIAL TRUST AND ENVIRONMENTAL TAX SUP-
PORT.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the figure shows the moderating effect of QoG on the link between pro-environmental value orientation and public support 
for environmental taxes, and the direct effects of social trust and QoG on environmental tax support. 
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FIGURE 2. SOCIAL TRUST, QOG, POLITICAL TRUST AND ENVIRONMENTAL TAX SUPPORT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the figure shows the moderating effect of QoG on the link between social trust and public support for environmental taxes, 
and the direct effects of political trust and QoG on environmental tax support. 
From the two theoretical models, four hypotheses can be derived.  
H1(A): Individuals with high levels of social trust are generally more supportive of higher taxes to 
protect the environment than individuals with low social trust.  
H1(B): Individuals with high levels of political trust are generally more supportive of higher taxes to 
protect the environment than individuals with low political trust.     
H2: Individuals living in countries with high levels of QoG are generally more supportive of higher 
taxes to protect the environment than individuals in countries with low levels of QoG.     
H3: The positive effect of social trust on public support for environmental taxes is stronger in coun-
tries with high levels of QoG.   
H4: The positive effect of pro-environmental values on public support for environmental taxes is 
stronger in countries with high levels of QoG.   
The first hypothesis has been tested by several scholars in previous research, but it is rarely shown 
whether the same effects hold across a range of country contexts internationally. In relation to the 
first hypothesis, a second hypothesis is derived. Keeping in mind the relation between QoG and 
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trust, people living in high QoG countries can be expected to be generally more supportive of envi-
ronmental taxes. The third hypothesis concerns the contingent effect of social trust and as theorized 
this effect may depend on the perceived quality of government institutions. Taking Svallfors (2013) 
as a main point of departure, the fourth hypothesis on the contingent effect of values can be derived. 
As suggested by his findings, and translated to this context, green values can be expected to have a 
stronger effect in high QoG countries. It was also suggested that green values could have a negative 
effect on low levels of QoG, but at this point there is not enough theoretical and empirical reason to 
derive such a hypothesis.      
The main contribution of this paper is the exploration of interaction effects. Thus, the main interest 
is the effects of values and social trust on public support for environmental taxes in relation to QoG. 
I do not intend to investigate the effects of QoG on trust (the dotted arrows in figures 1 and 2); I 
simply assume that a causal link exists. I will, however, investigate both the effects of QoG and 
political trust when testing H3 and H4 to see if it produces different results. 
Methodology, data and measures 
Method: Multilevel analysis  
In order to test the main research hypotheses, I need to take into account two levels of analysis – the 
first level being individuals and the second being country context – to see if the effect of individual 
qualities are contingent on country-level factors. This cannot be done using normal OLS regression 
and calls for a hierarchical regression model. Hierarchical regression models or multilevel analysis 
should be used when the data is nested or has a hierarchical structure, as in this case, where individuals 
are considered to be nested within countries.18 If clustering of individuals is ignored, there is a risk 
that estimated regression parameters and standard errors will be biased (Guo & Zhao 2000; Hox 
2002), usually causing underestimated standard errors and overestimated significance levels (Allison 
2009, in Svallfors 2013).      
To see whether there is clustering within countries, or if country context has had an effect on indi-
vidual-level characteristics, we need to study the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). The ICC 
helps estimate the nested effect, that is, the dependency in the data, by exploring within and between 
country variance. For the ISSP dataset, the variance that exists between countries in public support 
                                                   
18 The units of analysis in this study are individuals living in different country contexts.  
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for higher taxes to protect the environment is estimated to 5.8%, and for the WVS dataset to 8.1%. 
This means that about 5% and 8 % respectively of the total variation in public support for environ-
mental taxes is between countries and can be explained by country specific effects at the higher level.19 
There appears to be greater variance between individuals within countries than between countries, but 
the cross-country variation in both datasets is still large enough for a multilevel analysis to be mean-
ingful.   
Multilevel analysis is suitable in this case since it allows us to take into account the fact that individuals 
are embedded in different country contexts, and to deal with dependence in errors. Individuals sam-
pled from one country could be affected by factors in that particular context, providing them with 
similar patterns of behaviors and attitudes – different from individuals in other countries. Previous 
research on cross-country differences in support for environmental protection and attitudes towards 
environmental policy instruments shows that such contextual effects or clustering of individuals 
within countries exists (e.g. Aghion et al. 2010; Harring 2014a; Franzen & Meyer 2010). One ad-
vantage with using multilevel analysis is that we can allow regression parameters to vary, including 
intercepts and slopes of variables. This method thus allows us to assume that countries have different 
starting points in the level of support for environmental taxes (random intercepts), and that the ef-
fects of different predictors (in this case, values and social trust) might vary across countries (random 
slopes). To model the latter variation, interaction terms are used in the multilevel regression models 
to try to explain these varying effects. The main benefit of using this method, applying hierarchical 
models, is that it allows us to investigate interactions between individual-level qualities and contextual 
factors, which is necessary to test H3 and H4.   
Provided that measures of the dependent variable used in this study are categorical, containing more 
than two ordered categories, and that there is a possibility that the distances between the categories 
vary, a multilevel logistic regression analysis is perhaps a more suitable method to use (Harring 2014a; 
Fairbrother 2016; Harring & Lapuente 2016). However, this would make the interpretation of inter-
action terms difficult. As an initial test, this study therefore applies an ordinary multilevel analysis 
approach, treating the categorical dependent variable as a continuous variable.20 Yet, this comes at 
the cost of making the interpretation of the outcome variable more difficult, since we have to make 
                                                   
19 The rest of the contextual-level variation is within countries and can be explained by individual-level factors.  
20 With at least five categories, and symmetrically distributed observations, the bias introduced by treating a categorical 
variable as continuous is small (Bollen & Barb 1981; Johnson & Creech 1983, in Hox et al. 2010). With four or fewer 
categories regression parameters and standard errors usually have a downward bias.  
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a rather arbitrary decision about at what point on this new scale aversion towards green taxes turns 
into support.     
Data 
To investigate cross-level interactions of individual characteristics and country characteristics, we 
need to have more than 20 contexts at the higher-level variable (in this case countries), and the group 
sizes (i.e. the number of individuals living in each country) should not be too small (Kreft & de Leeuw 
1998). Using data from the survey Environment III by the ISSP, we have a sample of 26 countries 
with 14479 respondents (with answers on all variables included in the analysis). In this sample, 22 
countries belong to the European or Western spheres, while only four countries can be considered 
to be outside these contexts (South Africa, Philippines, Chile and South Korea). The data from the 
Fifth Wave of the WVS includes 32 countries and 26374 individuals.21 Exactly one half of the coun-
tries (16) can be considered as Western or European country contexts, while the other half covers 
countries outside these contexts. Considering the scopes of both datasets, a multilevel analysis is 
meaningful and can be performed. Testing the models in this paper on both datasets acts like a ro-
bustness check and strengthens our ability to test if the explanations of public support for green taxes 
from previous research hold across various country contexts.  
The data from the ISSP was collected in 2010 through self-completion questionnaires or face-to-face 
interviews, or both. The dataset originally includes answers from 45199 individuals on survey ques-
tions related to people’s personal views on environmental issues and the degrees of environmental 
concern, as well as trust in politicians, government and other people. The data from the WVS was 
collected using face-to-face interviews during the time period 2005-2009, covering a number of topics 
including the environment, politics and society. The WVS conducts nationally representative surveys 
in almost 100 countries containing close to 90% of the world’s population, using a common ques-
tionnaire to capture people’s beliefs and values in life. The advantage of the WVS data over the ISSP 
data is that it covers a broader number of countries; using both datasets thus gives a wider represen-
tation of countries from different contexts. One advantage of the ISSP survey is its specific focus on 
measuring attitudes related to the environment, whereas the WVS survey measures attitudes and 
values across many different areas, trying to capture “large trends”.        
                                                   
21 For complete lists of countries and number of respondents see Appendix C.  
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There are enough survey questions in the ISSP and WVS datasets to capture the individual-level 
variables of interest. To capture country-level variables, these datasets were merged with the QoG 
Basic Cross-Section Data (2015). The availability of survey questions in the ISSP and WVS data, 
makes it is possible to measure the main independent variables using different indicators to see if 
differing operationalizations affects the results of the analyses. The WVS has in some respects “bet-
ter” indicators, at least when it comes to measuring political trust. Apart from that, the same indica-
tors can be found in both datasets. Important to highlight is that the paper will not discuss which 
measures are the “best” ones to use, based on the results of the analyses. The operationalization of 
variables is outlined and discussed next, along with the motivations of why these particular measures 
and variables were included. What should be evident from this discussion is that there are no perfect 
measures, and that in some cases we have to use the best measures or proxies available in existing 
datasets.                   
Operationalization of variables    
Dependent variable 
Public support for environmental taxes 
The dependent variable in this study is public support for environmental taxes, measured as support 
for higher taxes to protect the environment. Two different survey questions from the ISSP and WVS 
datasets are used to capture this variable: “How willing would you be to pay much higher taxes in 
order to protect the environment?” with responses ranging from “very unwilling” (1) to “very willing” 
(5), from the ISSP, and “I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution”22 with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” 
(4), from the WVS. The former of the two survey questions has a clear reference to current tax-levels. 
This is true for the latter as well, but it also refers to a dramatic increase in current tax-levels by asking 
for willingness to pay much higher taxes. Furthermore, the latter survey question could be capturing 
opinions that someone else should pay the taxes. These small differences in nuance between the two 
survey questions could potentially affect the outcome.23 In any case, controls for current tax-levels 
are needed, mainly because the survey questions used to capture this variable are relativistic; they 
                                                   
22 Similarly to Svallfors (2013), using willingness to provide existing institutions with resources to redistribute.  
23 Research shows that one word in a survey question is enough to make a difference in the outcome, but the difference 
here should be viewed as a strength since we are testing different operationalizations of variables.  
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depend on current tax-levels of individual countries. To make them comparable I include a country-
level control for current tax-level. 
Since the variable is treated as continuous, we have to make a decision about on what point at the 
scale opposition against green taxes turns into support. The most reasonable “cut point” would be 
the value on each scale where individuals explicitly state that they agree with an increase in taxes, or 
are willing to pay higher taxes for environmental protection. In the WVS data values ≥3 should indi-
cate support and in the ISSP data values ≥4 should indicate support. An alternative cut point would 
be right in the middle of each scale; 2.5 in WVS data and 3 (“neither willing nor unwilling”) in the 
ISSP data, but this would provide for a less accurate picture. In contrast to previous research, the 
survey questions are used as concrete measures of support for green taxes.24 There have been various 
uses of these questions before, including measuring general support for environmental policy, will-
ingness to make economic sacrifices for the environment and willingness to pay for environmental 
protection. I believe that they can be used to measure support for environmental taxes specifically, 
that is, a specific type of government intervention, considering the clear reference to taxes. One could 
ask whether they really measure support for taxes, but they are still the best measures available.    
An alternative measure from the WVS (without a reference to taxes) was considered: “The govern-
ment should reduce environmental pollution, but it should not cost me any money”.25 Generally, 
environmental taxes impose higher costs on individuals, even if they often come with promises of 
reductions in other taxes to level out any extra costs. This particular question has been used in pre-
vious research to measure support for environmental state intervention, capturing attitudes that the 
government is responsible for environmental protection (Harring & Lapuente 2016). The survey 
question from the WVS used in this paper captures a shared responsibility and attitudes towards a 
policy imposing individual costs and risks of free-riding (ibid). Since the main interest in this study is 
not to capture people’s attitudes on government responsibility, I believe that the alternative question 
would be a poor fit for what we are trying to measure. The two survey questions that have been 
chosen here are more appropriate to measure support for green taxes, because both are stated in a 
sense that captures the second-order, free-riding dilemma of complying with an imposed policy.        
                                                   
24 Kollmann and Reichl (2013) are one exception, using the same survey question from the ISSP to measure acceptance 
of environmental taxes.  
25 If assuming that a respondent who agrees with the statement implies tax aversion. 
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Independent variables 
Political trust 
To measure political trust various survey questions have been used by scholars in previous research 
to explain attitudes towards environmental policy instruments, but most common are measures of 
trust in “politicians”, “the government” or “the parliament” (see Harring & Jagers 2013; Hammar & 
Jagers 2006; Konisky et al. 2008; Kollmann & Reichl 2013). For example, one could ask people to 
state how much confidence they have in the government in their nation’s capital, with responses 
ranging from “a great deal of confidence” to “none at all”.26 As has been argued, however, (Harring 
& Lapuente 2016) political trust is a difficult concept to measure since it can imply many different 
things; for example national pride or support for the current political party in office (Levi & Stoker 
2000), or trust in implementing authorities or the quality of government institutions (Rothstein & 
Stolle 2008). Moreover, trust in implementing institutions has been argued to be considerably differ-
ent from trust in representative institutions, including “the government”, “political parties” or “the 
parliament”.    
The main interest in this study is to capture trust in implementing authorities, and whether individuals 
believe that environmental taxes will be managed in an efficient, fair and non-corrupt (i.e. impartial) 
manner. It has been claimed that trust in implementing institutions is less dependent on things like 
partisanship and captures perceived quality of public institutions instead (ibid). Following Harring 
and Lapuente (2016), this study uses an index that combines three measures (index 1)27 in order to 
capture political trust defined as trust in implementing institutions: “confidence in the police”, “con-
fidence in the justice system”, and “confidence in the civil services” (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.773) from 
the WVS. For each of the survey questions, respondent answers range from “none at all” (1) to “a 
great deal of confidence” (4). Since the enforcement of a tax-system will depend on all three of these 
public institutions, I believe that this index is the best suitable measure of political trust considering 
available data. To see whether the outcome differs when a different operationalization is used, an 
index combining trust in government, parliament and political parties (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.843) is 
also used (index 2).28 For both these indexes higher scores indicate higher political trust.  
                                                   
26 This survey question is available in e.g. the Fifth Wave of the WVS. 
27 There is a weak correlation (0.23) between this index and QoG.    
28 There is no correlation (0.01) between this index and QoG.  
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To capture political trust using the ISSP dataset two measures are combined representing the com-
mon way of measuring political trust: “Most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out 
of it personally”, with responses ranging from “agree strongly” (1) to “disagree strongly” (5), and 
“Most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right”, with responses ranging 
from “disagree strongly” (1) to “agree strongly” (5). High scores on this index (Cronbach’s alpha: 
0.497) indicate high levels of political trust. It has been argued that the measure of trust in people in 
government might unintentionally capture trust in the current government, whereas trust in politi-
cians captures trust in political representatives in general and has been shown to be much more highly 
correlated with QoG (Harring 2016). In this study, political trust is defined as trust in implementing 
institutions and perceptions of these as uncorrupt, efficient and fair, which is closely related to QoG. 
Therefore, a different measure of political trust only including trust in politicians is also used.   
Social trust 
To measure social trust, defined as trust in people one does not generally know, there are two options. 
The first option is: “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try to be fair?”. Respondents can position themselves on a scale ranging from 
“would take advantage” (1) to “try to be fair” (10). Despite this particular operationalization of social 
trust being criticized (e.g. Thöni et al. 2012) it is considered an established way of measuring social 
trust (Harring & Lapuente 2016). According to others (Gächter et al. 2004) this is a better measure 
of actual trust and cooperative behavior, than the commonly used trust question. This is the second 
option: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?”, with responses ranging from “you can’t be too careful” (1) to “most 
people can be trusted” (5). Since both these measures of social trust have been criticized, both are 
used in this study to see if a different operationalization affects the results. For the analysis with the 
WVS dataset I use the established measure of whether people would take advantage or try to be fair, 
while from the ISSP dataset I use the common trust question. In addition, following Harring (2015), 
a combination of both these measures is used when analyzing ISSP data. This index was proven 
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.703). The same index was created with WVS data, but it was proven 
unreliable (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.362) and is therefore not used. All different measures of political and 
social trust were centered and standardized, to help reduce correlations between the interaction terms 
and their component variables, and to allow for comparisons of covariances across the two datasets. 
Comparisons should still be done with caution since the dependent variable is measured slightly dif-
ferently.   
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Pro-environmental value orientation                 
To capture value orientation, scholars in previous research have used either Schwartz’s value scheme, 
as part of capturing the components of the VBN chain, or Inglehart’s post-materialist values scale. 
Both Schwartz’s value scheme and Inglehart’s post-materialist values scale have been used to explain 
attitudes towards environmental policy instruments – measuring people’s pro-environmental values. 
In this study, the latter measure is used. The post-materialist value scales from both the WVS and 
ISSP data consist of four items, where respondents are asked to state what two issues should be the 
most important for their country. In the WVS, those who selected “giving people more say in im-
portant government decisions” and “protecting freedom of speech” are coded as having post-mate-
rialist values (2), while those who selected “maintaining order in the nation” and “fighting rising 
prices” are coded as having materialist values (0). Those who selected one materialist and one post-
materialist item are coded as “mixed” (1). The data from two sub-questions in the ISSP survey was 
added into one variable to get the same structure in response categories, following the same classifi-
cation criteria.   
Quality of Government 
To capture the level of QoG in a country there are several different measures that have been used in 
previous research. In this study, at least when it comes to QoG as a moderator in the hypothesized 
relationships, the main interest is the level of perceived QoG. This could be captured by political trust 
at the individual-level measuring trust in implementing institutions and thus also the belief in their 
fair, efficient and impartial performance. Alternatively, it can be captured with the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicator of QoG consisting of three variables: “Corruption”, “Law and 
Order” and “Bureaucracy Quality”.29 This measure of QoG is highly correlated with Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Svensson 2005) and has been shown to produce 
similar results as both the CPI and the World Bank Estimate of Government Efficiency (WBE). 
Svallfors (2013) has found strong correlations between public perceptions of QoG and these (mainly) 
expert-based measures. The measures available on the individual level for this study are not enough 
to capture people’s perceptions of QoG in a similar way (see Svallfors 2013); the closest being trust 
                                                   
29 “Corruption” measures corruption within the political system. “Law” is a sub-component measuring the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, whereas “Order” is a sub-component measuring popular observance of the law. “Bureau-
cracy Quality” measures the strength and expertise of the bureaucracy to govern without interruptions in government 
services or drastic changes in policy. Scores on the ICRG index indicate the mean value of these three variables. Higher 
values indicate higher QoG (Svallfors 2013: 371).        
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in implementing authorities. This trust does not necessarily mean high QoG, since people can have 
trust in corrupt institutions as well, if they are the ones being favored by the system. Therefore, both 
the ICRG index and political trust are used when investigating interactions to see if it produces dif-
ferent results. The ideal measure would be to have individuals’ own perceptions of QoG, but as has 
been shown by Svallfors (2013) these are strongly correlated with expert-based judgments and appear 
to be driven largely by the same factors. One drawback with the ICRG indicator is that it does not 
take into account varying levels of corruption or QoG within countries; it provides an average meas-
ure. It is, for example, possible that people who live in areas that are more affected by corruption are 
more negative towards green taxes than people in less corrupt areas.    
Controls30 
Individual-level controls 
One individual characteristic that is included in the analysis is personal or household income. Income 
is an important variable since it has been found to affect public support for economic instruments in 
particular (Hammar & Jagers 2006; Harring & Jagers 2013; Harring 2014, 2015; Harring & Lapuente 
2016). It is assumed that people at higher income levels can afford the extra costs, which makes them 
less averse towards taxes and other economic incentives. Another reason to include income is that 
environmental concern, which has been shown to be closely related to post-materialist attitudes, is 
related to income. People with high incomes have more post-materialist attitudes and are more con-
cerned about the environment (Franzen & Meyer 2010). The possible influence on post-materialist 
values and the dependent variable are two reasons for including income as a control variable. Personal 
income was only available in the ISSP dataset, while from the WVS dataset household income is used 
instead. The former was log-transformed due to a positively skewed distribution.       
Another control variable that has been used in previous studies is political party affiliation or ideology. 
People’s attitudes towards government steering are typically affected by ideological positioning. Some 
studies have found that both people to the left and right are more positive towards economic instru-
ments than those who lack a clear left or right position. It has been suggested that people who con-
sider themselves more to the left on the political scale are more positive towards taxation in general, 
whereas people to the right (if right means more market-oriented) are more positive towards the 
                                                   
30 For the exact coding of control variables see Appendix A.   
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market-based mechanisms underlying such economic tools (Harring 2016). Other studies have found 
that environmental protection is a political ideology issue in some countries, while in many countries 
it is not. Many studies have shown that support for environmental protection is stronger in countries 
where people are more to the left, but recent studies have shown that it is rather the opposite if 
anything (Fairbrother 2016). Whether support for higher taxes to protect the environment depends 
on a person being left or right thus appears inconclusive based on findings in previous research.  
Provided that individuals’ perceptions of environmental conditions and whether they consider them-
selves and people close to them to be affected by environmental problems are argued to matter for 
their attitudes towards imposing policies to decrease pollution, controls for this are included. Coun-
try-level variables measuring the current state of the environment (e.g. GHG emissions per capita or 
the Environmental Performance Index), would not provide an accurate picture of people’s percep-
tions of and whether they are affected by environmental problems. Pollution might be more concen-
trated to certain areas within a country, making some people more supportive of measures to decrease 
pollution than others. Thus, individual-level controls are included. From the WVS dataset an index 
combining three survey questions was created. The respondents were asked to rate the severity of 
different environmental problems in one’s community, including poor air quality, poor water quality, 
and poor sewage and sanitation (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.899). These particular issues were selected be-
cause they are more easily perceived and can pose direct health effects compared to, for example, 
loss of biodiversity or pollution of the world’s great oceans, lakes and rivers, which most people 
perceive as less of a threat. From the ISSP data, a survey question asking respondents if environmen-
tal problems have a direct effect on their everyday life is used. As has been theorized and found in 
previous research, those who are most affected by pollution are more likely to be supportive of pol-
icies aimed at decreasing pollution (Schade & Schlag 2003; Cherry et al. 2012; Hammar & Jagers 2006; 
Kallbekken & Sælen 2011).            
Demographic variables including education, age and gender are also included in the analysis. Previous 
research has shown that more highly educated people (e.g. those holding a university degree or at 
least have studied at universities/colleges) are likely to be more positive towards green taxes than less 
educated people (Hammar & Jagers 2006). Age and gender have been argued to matter for people’s 
attitudes toward the environment and policies for environmental protection. Young people and 
women are assumed to be more positive towards environmental protection in general (Hornback 
1974; Van Liere and Dunlap 1980, in Harring 2016). Age has been found to affect attitudes towards 
higher taxes for environmental protection, showing that people older than 30 are more negative than 
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people at lower ages and that younger people are more likely to be supportive. Gender has been 
found to have no considerable effect or no effect at all on support for (increased) taxes to protect 
the environment (see Hammar & Jagers 2006; Harring 2016). In many studies this variable has not 
been included at all. Given that a different dataset is used in this analysis (the WVS dataset), gender 
is included as a control.    
Employment status was also included due to its potential effect on both the dependent and one of 
the independent variables (environmental values). Inglehart’s 4-item post-materialist scale has been 
criticized to be affected by more temporary things like unemployment and inflation (Hansen & Tol 
2003). It is possible that, for example, a person who recently lost one’s job expresses more materialist 
values than he or she would if they had stayed employed (as they have been perhaps for many years 
prior). Employment status, which is related to a person’s income31, could also affect attitudes towards 
higher taxes for environmental protection held by respondents at the time of the survey. A person 
who states that one is currently employed is expected to be more positive towards green taxes, since 
he or she can afford the extra costs. For these reasons, employment status is an important control to 
include.    
Country-level controls  
Two variables are included as controls on the country level: real GDP per capita and current tax-
level. Current tax-level is included as a control due to the phrasing of the survey questions used to 
measure the dependent variable; referring to an increase in taxes from the current tax-levels. Moreo-
ver, it is possible that people who live in countries where overall tax-levels are high; already having 
enough extra costs, are more averse towards tax-increases. To capture current tax-levels the best 
available proxy is used, measuring tax-revenues as the percentage share of GDP. This measure does 
not only include environmental taxes, which is good since it is the overall tax-level of a country that 
matters and not just environmental taxes.             
Real GDP per capita is used as a control in some of the models in this study, as a proxy for economic 
development.32 It is not included in the models with interaction terms since it would be difficult to 
disentangle the effects of QoG and economic development. People living in countries with high 
levels of economic development could be expected to be more supportive of green taxes than people 
                                                   
31 The correlation with household income is weak (.205) and the correlation with personal income is moderate (.456).  
32 The advantage of real GDP per capita over normal GDP per capita is that it takes into account inflation.  
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in low income countries, due to more green values as a result of post-materialism (Inglehart 1995). 
Moreover, green taxes are expected to imply higher costs (i.e. some will not be able to afford them), 
but they might also be perceived as something that could impede economic growth. In countries 
where a certain level of economic development has not yet been reached, individuals might thus be 
more averse towards green taxes (Harring 2016). 
Economic development could also have a negative effect on support for green taxes33, since high-
cost behaviors are more likely to be targeted in developed countries where most people can afford 
to own a car or engage in other polluting activities. Research shows that people who are affected by 
a policy (in terms of inflicting costs and requiring behavioral changes) are more averse towards im-
posed measures (Jakobsson et al. 2000; de Groot & Schuitema 2012; Hammar & Jagers 2006; Kall-
bekken & Aasen 2010). For these reasons real GDP per capita is an important control. It is problem-
atic to exclude economic development from any analysis dealing with support for the environment, 
provided the effects that economic development has on people’s values and the ability to pay higher 
taxes for environmental protection. However, it is necessary in this case to avoid blurring the picture 
showing the results of the interactions. Real GDP per capita was log-transformed.    
Limitations and scope conditions  
This study only looks at support for environmental taxes in general as policy instruments for protect-
ing the environment, not choices between different instruments34 (see Harring 2014a) that could 
provide for deeper understandings on people’s underlying motivations. Contrasting support for taxes 
against support for regulations would be interesting. Furthermore, this study does not distinguish 
between what kinds of behaviors that are targeted by the environmental taxes. Following from this, 
different levels of coerciveness and perceived individual costs are not taken into account – two factors 
with influence on support for various policy instruments. With better data, and separation of targeted 
high- and low-cost behaviors, perceived individual costs could be included in the analysis. Other 
explanatory factors of public support that are not included in the analysis of this paper are the per-
ceived fairness and effectiveness of taxes. The main focus here is on trust, values and QoG, while 
other explanations such as these are left aside for other research. Institutional context, or the quality 
of government institutions, is chosen as the moderating factor of individual-level relationships since 
                                                   
33 Gelissen (2007), for example, applying a multilevel analysis on 50 countries using WVS data found that people in 
wealthier countries are less willing to pay for environmental protection.   
34 This would, however, significantly complicate the interpretation of the interaction terms used in this study.  
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this is a factor that has been discussed extensively in the literature and has strong theoretical reasons 
to be included in an analysis of green taxes in particular. The problem of excluding economic devel-
opment is something that should be kept in mind, however, and trying to disentangle the effects 
between QoG and economic development is beyond the scope of this paper.    
While the results of the study could be generalizable to a larger population of individuals and coun-
tries, given that we find the same effects in both datasets, we still cannot make any causal inferences 
based on the performed analysis since this requires the use of time-series or panel data. This is one 
of the drawbacks with the method used35 (see Feller & Gelman 2015; Hill 2013). One limitation that 
could potentially affect the results of the analyses is that we cannot take into account whether envi-
ronmental taxes are understood differently in different country contexts. In corrupt contexts, the tax-
system might not be understood in the same terms as in high QoG contexts where people cannot 
escape from paying the taxes, or people might not comply with the taxes even if they have stated that 
they are supportive of them.36 The second-order free-riding problem is most likely larger in low QoG 
countries, as explained above. This might be a valid explanation for the case of Mali, an identified 
outlier37, where corruption has been described as being widespread and systematic across all levels of 
society (Transparency International 2008), and still remains a big problem (Freedom House 2015). 
Other limitations, mainly related to the measures used in operationalizing the variables of interest are 
discussed above. With these limitations in mind, we now turn to the results of the analysis. 
 
 
                                                   
35 We can only talk about associations, even if modeling varying effects can help in making causal inferences.  
36 In several developing countries (e.g. Ethiopia, Ghana, Peru, Thailand, Mali and Burkina Faso) support for green taxes 
is relatively high compared to developed countries or emerging economies (see figure 3 and 4, Appendix D), despite high 
corruption levels. While people in these poor countries might be supportive of green taxes since they are highly affected 
by environmental degradation, they might not be willing to pay the taxes in the end. In African countries, most people see 
government tax-revenues as important national development resources, but distrust in tax-officials causes high non-com-
pliance with tax obligations and makes tax-evasion more acceptable among citizens (Afrobarometer 2013). In Latin Amer-
ican countries, state legitimacy, including corruption, is an issue that affects people’s view of tax-obligations; making tax-
evasion highly justified in some country contexts (Latinobarometer 2010). In low QoG countries in European contexts 
similar issues might exist due to corruption, but people might not be as affected by environmental degradation and climate 
change (related to geographic location), resulting in higher tax-aversion instead (e.g. Hungary, Romania and Ukraine).          
37 Mali scores high on the dependent variable compared to all other countries in the sample, despite having the lowest 
score on ICRG’s indicator of QoG.         
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Results 
The results of the multilevel analysis using WVS data are presented in table 1 below. This analysis 
includes political trust measured as trust in implementing institutions and uses QoG as part of the 
interaction terms. Results with the alternative operationalization of political trust are presented in 
table 1 and interactions with political trust are presented in tables 2 and 3 in Appendix B. 
 The first model includes fixed effects of trust and values without individual- and country-level con-
trols; these are added in the second model. The third model includes a random effect of social trust 
and an interaction term without controls; the fourth model adds controls. The fifth model includes 
a random effect of post-materialist values and an interaction term without controls; the sixth model 
adds controls. Models 2, 4 and 6 include individual-level controls (household income, ideology/left-
right political affiliation, affected by environmental degradation, education, age, gender and employ-
ment status). All six models include random intercepts.  
The estimates of the fixed effects are interpreted as the average effect of each predictor across all 
countries in the sample, while the estimates of the random effects are interpreted as the variance 
from these average effects. Since some of the variables have been centered (see Appendix A), the 
intercept (constant) is interpreted as the mean of the dependent variable at the value that the predictor 
was centered on, which in this case is the country mean. The random intercept is in turn the variance 
from this intercept.       
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TABLE 1. MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS USING WVS DATA.  
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. Political trust and social trust are standardized and centered 
variables. Real GDP per capita and household income are log-transformed. a: reference category – post-materialist or mixed; b: 
reference category – materialist or mixed; c: see main text. Source: World Values Survey – Fifth Wave (2005-2009) and QOG 
Basic Cross-Section Data 2015.    
DV: Public support for 
green taxes 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed effects       
Level 1        
Political trust (index1) .08*** 
(.01) 
.08*** 
(.01)  
.08*** 
(.01) 
.08*** 
(.01) 
.08*** 
(.01) 
.08*** 
(.01) 
Social trust  .03*** 
(.01) 
.02*** 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.03) 
 .03*** 
(.01) 
.02*** 
(.01) 
Values 
Materialista 
 
Post-materialistb  
 
 
-.06*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.02) 
 
-.04*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.02) 
 
-.06*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.02) 
 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.02) 
 
-.06*** 
(.01) 
-.10 
(.07) 
  
-.05*** 
(.01) 
-.08 
(.08) 
Interaction effects        
Social trust*QoG   .06 
(.05) 
.05 
(.05) 
  
Environmental values*QoG     .37* 
(.11) 
.30* 
(.11) 
Individual-level controlsc excluded included excluded included excluded included 
Level 2       
Current tax-level  -.004 
(.007) 
 -.01 
(.008) 
 -.01 
(.008) 
Real GDP per capita (log)  -.15** 
(.05) 
    
QoG  .44 
(.29) 
-.22 
(.21) 
-.20 
(.20) 
-.27 
(.21) 
-.24 
(.21) 
Constant 2.64*** 
(.04) 
3.51*** 
(.34) 
2.77*** 
(.13) 
2.65*** 
(.18) 
2.80*** 
(.13)  
2.68*** 
(.18) 
Random effects       
Constant (country intercepts) .06*** 
(.01) 
.04*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
Social trust   .002** 
(.001)  
.002** 
(.001) 
  
Environmental values  
(post-materialist) 
    .01 
(.004) 
.01* 
(.004) 
Log likelihood  -64022.84 -63632.37 -63979.34 -63599.04 -63986.10 -63608.80 
AIC 64036.84 63680.37 64001.34 63651.04 64008.10 63660.80 
N (Level 1) 26472 26472 26472 26472 26472 26472 
N (Level 2) 32 32  32 32  32 32  
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We can see that social and political trust and people’s values are highly significant predictors of sup-
port for environmental taxes. People with higher levels of social and political trust are more support-
ive of taxes. Political trust has a bigger effect size than social trust, and when using the traditional 
measure of political trust operationalized as trust in government, political parties and parliament the 
effect size is only slightly bigger (see table 1, Appendix B). The coefficients of social trust and political 
trust are interpreted as the effects of a one standard deviation difference on the mean of the depend-
ent variable. The coefficients of values have the expected signs; individuals with post-materialist val-
ues are generally more supportive of higher taxes to protect the environment than people who pri-
oritize materialist values. QoG is not statistically significant in any of the models.38 The high correla-
tion (.778) between real GDP per capita and QoG could cause multicollinearity in my models. There-
fore, real GDP per capita is not included in the models with interaction terms. When running an 
analysis of model 2 without real GDP per capita QoG remained insignificant, and when excluding 
QoG the negative effect of real GDP per capita persisted. Nevertheless, the results of the second 
model that includes both QoG and real GDP per capita should be interpreted with caution. Follow-
ing Svallfors (2013) argument not to include variables that are possibly endogenous to the variables 
of analytical interest39, in this case QoG, a model was also run without political trust. This did not 
change the outcome results, therefore both variables are included.   
As we can see in models 3 and 4, the random effect of social trust is significant, meaning that social 
trust has a varying effect across countries (see figure 3), but the interaction terms are not significant. 
When using political trust in the interaction instead, this term is significant however. From the results 
of model 4 in table 2 in Appendix B, we can derive that as political trust increases the positive effect 
of social trust on support for green taxes decreases.40 This is also true for the alternative operation-
alization of political trust (see table 3, Appendix B). That is, social trust becomes less important at 
higher levels of political trust. The coefficient of social trust is now interpreted as the effect on public 
support when political trust is zero and, based on the results, social trust should thereby have a pos-
itive effect even at low levels of political trust. The varying effect of social trust across a sample of 
countries is illustrated in figure 3 (for graph including all 32 countries see figure 1, Appendix D).  
                                                   
38 In models 3-6 this should not come as a surprise since QoG is part of the interaction term.  
39 Including such variables in the model would, according to Svallfors, “completely blur the picture” (Svallfors 2013: 370).    
40 Adding the coefficients of the individual effect of social trust (.02) and the contingent effect (-.012), we can derive that 
the positive effect is decreasing.   
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FIGURE 3. THE RANDOM EFFECT OF SOCIAL TRUST ON SUPPORT FOR GREEN TAXES ACROSS 
10 COUNTRIES. 
 
Data: World Values Survey, Fifth Wave (2005-2009).  
The graph shows the mean expected values on the dependent variable for each standardized score 
on the social trust scale for each country. From the graph, we can derive that people with similar 
scores on social trust in different countries have varying levels of support for green taxes. For exam-
ple, individuals with a Z-score of 1 on the social trust scale in Indonesia are generally less supportive 
of (or more averse toward) green taxes than individuals with the same Z-score in Norway or Canada, 
but more supportive (or less averse) than individuals with the same Z-score in Slovenia or Poland.41 
We can also see that individuals with different levels of social trust within countries have different 
levels of support for green taxes, looking at the random slopes. A few of the countries in the total 
sample show downward slopes, as is illustrated by the cases of Ghana and Morocco.42 In these coun-
tries, support for taxes is lower (or aversion is higher) at higher levels of social trust. Several countries 
in the sample show relatively plane, but crooked slopes with high and low peaks, as is illustrated by 
the case of Zambia. For cases like this, it is difficult to interpret whether support (or aversion) is 
                                                   
41 Recalling that value 3 on the dependent variable (y-axis in the graph), indicates support for green taxes.  
42 Only Morocco was identified as a statistically significant outlier. Removing Morocco from the model did not make any 
changes to the final results – the decreasing positive effect of social trust at higher levels of political trust remains (see 
table 6, Appendix B).  
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higher or lower at higher levels of social trust in the country, unless one only looks at both ends of 
the slope. Most of the countries in the sample show upward slopes, as is illustrated by the cases of 
Canada, Cyprus, Indonesia, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, and Switzerland. In these countries, support 
for taxes is higher (or aversion is lower) at higher levels of social trust. Generally, the slopes do not 
appear to vary much across countries (see figure 1, Appendix D).            
From models 5 and 6, we can see that the interaction terms of post-materialist values and QoG are 
significant.43 This holds also when the alternative measure of political trust is used in the analysis (see 
table 1, Appendix B), and the interaction term is insignificant when any of the operationalizations of 
political trust are used as part of the interaction term instead of QoG (see model 6 in tables 2 and 3, 
Appendix B). Based on the results of model 6, we can see that post-materialist values have a negative 
effect on zero (low) levels of QoG. As QoG increases the negative effect decreases, and when higher 
levels of QoG are reached the effect becomes positive.44 At higher levels of QoG, the positive effect 
of values on support for green taxes consequently gets stronger. The interaction effect between values 
and QoG is illustrated in figure 4 below. 45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
43 Political trust can be considered an endogenous variable to QoG (Svallfors 2013), the same analysis was therefore 
performed without political trust included – the results remained the same however.  
44 The effect becomes positive when QoG is about 0.27; at this threshold the positive effect is weak (.001).    
45 Because of limitations in the software used, the marginal effect of values could not be displayed. Instead, the graph 
shows trends, that is, the general level of support for green taxes among individuals holding different values.   
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FIGURE 4. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN QOG, VALUES AND SUPPORT FOR GREEN TAXES.46  
 
Data: World Values Survey, Fifth Wave (2005-2009), and QOG Basic Cross-Section Data (2015). 
The green line (the upper line at score 1 on the x-axis) represents post-materialist values, and the blue 
line materialist or mixed values. While the negative effect of post-materialist values is not very clear 
from this graph, showing trends, we can see that people with post-materialist values in high QoG 
countries are generally more supportive of green taxes than people in low QoG countries. As coun-
tries reach score 1 on the ICRG indicator of QoG, the average effect of green values is positive.47 
Since the graph only shows trends and not the marginal effect of values on support, we cannot say 
that the effect gets any stronger; only that people holding similar (or different) values have varying 
levels of support for green taxes at different levels of QoG. From the graph, we can see that people 
with post-materialist values are generally less supportive of green taxes than people with materialist 
or mixed values at low levels of QoG (approximately below score 0.4 on the ICRG indicator). Past 
the intersection of the two lines, people with post-materialist values are generally more supportive of 
                                                   
46 This graph was produced without Mali, which was found to be a statistically significant outlier. While removing Mali did 
not make any significant changes to the estimates of the analysis (see table 7, Appendix B), it did change the outlook of 
the graph. For the resulting graph with Mali included see figure 2, Appendix D.    
47 People with post-materialist values in high QoG countries are generally supportive of green taxes, but they can be 
supportive at lower levels of QoG as well.      
Materialist or mixed 
Post-materialist 
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(or less averse towards) environmental taxes than people holding materialist or mixed values. At 
higher levels of QoG, the difference in support for green taxes between the value types is larger.        
In model 5, the random effect of post-materialist values is not significant. In another version of the 
fifth model, where only random slopes and no interaction was included, this random effect was sig-
nificant however. Including the interaction term in the model made the variation in the effect of post-
materialist values disappear (the random effect is no longer significant), which means that QoG suc-
cessfully explains why the effect of values varies across countries.48 In model 6, with controls, the 
random effect is still significant but the variance in the effect of values did decrease when the inter-
action term was added to the model.                 
The results of the multilevel analysis using ISSP data are presented in table 2 below. The six models 
follow the same structure as the above models with the WVS data. Models 2, 4 and 6 thus similarly 
include individual-level controls (personal income, ideology/left-right political affiliation, affected by 
environmental degradation, education, age, gender and employment status). Following the above 
analyses using WVS data, interactions using QoG are presented here. Results with alternative opera-
tionalizations of social and political trust and the models using political trust as part of the interaction 
terms can be found in table 4 in Appendix B. The alternative operationalization of social trust cannot 
be argued to be better, rather the two-item index should be able to capture social trust better than 
the one-item measure if anything. The political trust measure consisting of one item only could, on 
the other hand, be argued to be better than the two-item index, since it should exclude the risk of 
capturing trust in the current government. The results presented in table 2 below are from the analysis 
including both two-item indexes of trust.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
48 The high correlation with economic development should, however, be kept in mind.  
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Table 2. Multilevel analysis using ISSP data.  
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. Political trust and social trust are standardized and centered 
variables. Real GDP per capita and personal income are log-transformed. a: reference category – post-materialist or mixed; b: 
reference category – materialist or mixed; c: see main text. Source: International Social Survey Programme – Environment III 
2010 and QOG Basic Cross-Section Data 2015.     
DV: Public support for 
green taxes 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed effects       
Level 1        
Political trust (index) .15*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.01) 
.16*** 
(.01) 
.16*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.01)  
.15*** 
(.01) 
Social trust (index) .15*** 
(.01) 
.13** 
(.01) 
.15* 
(.07) 
.16* 
(.07) 
.15*** 
(.01) 
.13*** 
(.01) 
Values 
Materialista 
 
Post-materialistb  
 
-.19*** 
(.02) 
.32*** 
(.03) 
 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
.22*** 
(.03) 
 
-.19*** 
(.02) 
.31*** 
(.03) 
 
-.14*** 
(.02) 
.21*** 
(.03) 
 
-.18*** 
(.02) 
.42 
(.22) 
 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
.39 
(.23) 
Interaction effects       
Social trust*QoG   -.01 
(.01) 
-.05 
(.09) 
  
Environmental values*QoG     -.12 
(.27) 
-.20 
(.28) 
Individual-level controlsc excluded included excluded included excluded included 
Level 2       
Current tax-level  -.002 
(.01) 
 -.002 
(.01) 
 .003 
(.01) 
Real GDP per capita (log)  .005 
(.14) 
    
QoG  .65 
(.49) 
.57* 
(.27) 
.67* 
(.30) 
.58* 
(.28) 
.61 
(.31) 
Constant 2.53*** 
(.05) 
1.57 
(1.21) 
2.11*** 
(.21) 
1.61*** 
(.24) 
2.10*** 
(.21)  
1.56*** 
(.24) 
Random effects       
Constant (country intercepts) .07** 
(.02) 
.06** 
(.02) 
.06** 
(.02) 
.07** 
(.02) 
.06** 
(.02) 
.07** 
(.02) 
Social trust   .005* 
(.002) 
.005* 
(.002) 
  
Environmental values 
(post-materialist) 
    .03 
(.02) 
.03* 
(.02) 
Log likelihood -44756.50 -43998.48 -44709.84 -43949.78 -44738.53 -43976.99 
AIC 44770.50 44052.48 44731.84 44007.78 44760.53 44034.99 
N (Level 1) 14479 14479 14479 14479 14479 14479 
N (Level 2) 26 26 26  26 26  26  
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Similar to the WVS data, social trust and political trust are shown to be significant predictors of public 
support for environmental taxes. As political and social trust increases, support for green taxes in-
creases. Both variables of trust are standardized, and coefficients are interpreted in the same way as 
with the WVS data. The effect size of political trust is bigger than the effect size of social trust in 
model 2 without interactions. With the alternative operationalization of political trust, it is the oppo-
site; the effect size of social trust is bigger than the effect size of political trust (see models in table 4, 
Appendix B). Values also come out significant with the expected signs; post-materialism has a posi-
tive effect and materialism has a negative effect on public support for environmental taxes. As was 
the case with the WVS data, model 2 should be interpreted with caution, due to potential multicol-
linearity. When running an analysis on model 2 without real GDP per capita, QoG turns out signifi-
cant. Running the analysis without QoG, on the other hand, real GDP per capita remains insignificant 
(see table 5, Appendix B).49 As we can see in models 3, 4 and 5 the coefficient of QoG is positive 
and significant; as the level of QoG increases people become more supportive of green taxes.50   
The interesting results are those in models 3-6 including the random effects and interactions. The 
random effect of social trust is significant in model 3 and 4, but the interaction term is not significant. 
When political trust is used in the interaction instead of QoG, the interaction term turns out signifi-
cant however (see table 4, Appendix B). The effect is contrary to the results of the analysis using the 
WVS data. Calculating the total effect of social trust by adding the coefficients of social trust and the 
interaction term, the interpretation is that as political trust increases the positive effect of social trust 
increases (not decreases). The coefficient of social trust is positive and significant at zero levels of 
political trust, meaning that social trust has a positive effect even at low levels of political trust. The 
random effect of social trust is still significant when the interaction term is included, but the variance 
in the effect of social trust decreases by adding the interaction term to a random slopes model.51 
Contrary to the findings in the analysis with the WVS data, no significant interaction effect between 
values and QoG (or political trust) is found in models 5 and 6.   
There are no big differences between the models with or without controls in both datasets as regards 
the coefficients of the main explanatory variables, as well as the interaction terms and random effects. 
                                                   
49 This holds when removing personal income, which has a strong correlation (.621) with real GDP per capita.  
50 The insignificant coefficient in model 6 could be explained by the strong correlation (.654) with personal income (when 
personal income is removed, QoG is significant), and/or the inclusion of the interaction term. 
51 Random slopes models are not presented due to the small margins (number of decimals); they would not show any 
difference in variances after rounding off the estimates.   
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Results should, however, be interpreted looking at the full models. We can see that the model fit 
improves by looking at the AIC values. The AIC is corrected for model complexity, which means 
that it takes into account the number of parameters that have been estimated. Smaller values mean 
better model fit. Log-likelihood, also a measure of model fit, can only be compared if the new model 
contains all of the effects or predictors of the former model. Consequently, we cannot compare models 
without controls with models with controls. Comparing the log-likelihood of model 2 with the log-
likelihoods of models 4 and 6, we can see that the model fit has significantly improved by modeling 
the variability in slopes. 
Analysis 
From the results of the analyses, we can conclude that the effects of political and social trust are 
pretty constant across country contexts and different datasets. People with higher social and political 
trust are generally more supportive of higher taxes to protect the environment. This provides support 
to the first hypothesis (H1A and H1B), and we can say that trust holds as an explanation for public 
support for green taxes internationally. Generally, the effect size of political trust is larger than the 
effect size of social trust, even if there is some indication of the opposite with an alternative opera-
tionalization. This was the case when using a measure combining political trust measured as trust in 
politicians and social trust measured by the commonly used trust question.52 Since the WVS data 
offers a better measure of political trust measured as trust in implementing institutions, one could 
argue that the results of the analysis using WVS data provides a more accurate picture. As has been 
shown in recent research, the effect of political trust on support for environmental protection53 is 
much larger than the effect of social trust (Fairbrother 2016). The majority of the operationalizations 
used in the analyses in this study support this finding. In this paper, the effect of social trust was 
found to vary cross-nationally, which can be explained by levels of political trust. This partly adds to 
the superiority of political trust over social trust in explaining public support for environmental taxes. 
The interaction between social and political trust is discussed further below.   
With regard to the individual effect of the quality of government institutions, the results were rather 
mixed across the two datasets. In the ISSP dataset, the problem of including real GDP per capita and 
                                                   
52 “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?” 
53 Using willingness to pay higher taxes/prices or to make economic sacrifices for environmental protection as dependent 
variable, which is similar to the operationalization of the dependent variable in this study.  
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QoG in the same model was illustrated. Excluding real GDP per capita, made QoG significant across 
most of the models, showing that people living in high QoG countries are more supportive of envi-
ronmental taxes. In the analysis using the WVS data, QoG did not turn out significant despite ex-
cluding real GDP per capita and possible endogenous variables. So, while the second hypothesis (H2) 
is supported by the ISSP data, it is not supported by the WVS data. We can only speculate about why 
this is the case, keeping in mind that the two datasets include different countries. While the ISSP 
sample mainly consists of European or Western countries, the WVS sample is much more balanced 
and international in scope.   
Since the WVS data contains a broader range of countries, we could also expect the variation in QoG 
to be larger. One plausible argument for why we still do not find a significant effect, is that people 
have different understandings of corruption; something that is considered a gift in some cultures is 
considered a bribe in other cultures where corruption is not as widespread (Bardhan 1997; de Sardan 
1999; Hasty 2005, in Persson et al. 2013). This causes substantial variation in public acceptance of 
corruption across countries and could be one reason why QoG does not appear to matter in this 
dataset. Furthermore, the measure of QoG included in the analyses does not take into account vari-
ations in QoG within countries. It is possible that people living in areas where corruption is widely 
spread are more negative towards taxes than people who live in areas with less corruption. Taking 
into account this variation might change the outcome. From these results, QoG does not appear to 
have a constant effect internationally and across datasets. In some cases, it appears like political trust 
is what matters for support for green taxes rather than the quality of government institutions when 
looking at the interactions.  
An interesting side note is that real GDP per capita was found to have a negative effect in the WVS 
dataset, that is, people living in wealthier countries are negative towards an increase in taxes for en-
vironmental protection. Theoretically, we would expect people in these countries to be more sup-
portive of green taxes, given the effect of economic development on values and the affordability of 
paying higher taxes. As has been found in previous research, economic development can have a 
negative effect on public support for taxes. The explanation provided here is that people engaging in 
polluting activities are more likely to be targeted by policies such as taxes in developed countries, 
making them more averse. People in less developed countries, on the other hand, who usually are 
most affected by environmental pollution, are likely to be more supportive of taxes for environmental 
protection. The results of the analysis using WVS data support these arguments.          
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Concerning the random effects and interactions, which are the main contribution of this study, some 
interesting results were found. There is a significant random effect of social trust, even if the varying 
effect across countries is not that large. In both the WVS and ISSP datasets no interaction was found 
between social trust, QoG and public support for green taxes. This does not provide support to the 
third hypothesis (H3) that the effect of social trust is contingent on QoG. However, the effect of 
social trust was found to be contingent on political trust instead. The results from the analyses using 
WVS data and ISSP data are conflicting. While the WVS data shows that the positive effect of social 
trust decreases when political trust increases, the ISSP data shows that this effect increases. The for-
mer is counterintuitive since theory predicts that political trust increases social trust (Rothstein & 
Stolle 2008): when people perceive implementing institutions as more trustworthy, trust in others to 
comply with imposed policies should also increase.  
One reason why the effect of social trust would decrease could be a belief that the tax-system will be 
credibly enforced and potential free-riders punished, when political trust is high. In a sense, social 
trust becomes subordinate to political trust. The findings within the ISSP dataset fits the theoretical 
reasoning made in this paper, that social trust should not even matter at low levels of QoG, better. 
At higher levels of QoG, along with higher political trust, social trust should have a stronger positive 
effect. The interaction taking place between political trust and social trust needs to be further ex-
plored, since it appears to vary across countries and datasets. The results of this study show that it is 
political trust that matters for the effect of social trust on support for green taxes, and not the quality 
of government institutions, which suggests that they (to some extent) are measuring different things. 
The weak correlation between political trust and ICRG’s indicator of QoG (see figure 5, Appendix 
D) supports this interpretation.     
The fourth hypothesis (H4) on the interaction between environmental values, QoG and support for 
environmental taxes is supported by the WVS data. Based on the results of the analysis post-materi-
alist values have a negative effect at zero levels of QoG, and as QoG increases this effect becomes 
positive and stronger at higher levels of QoG. From the graph illustrating the interaction between 
green values and QoG (figure 4), we cannot really see that the effect of values is negative at low levels 
of QoG, but we can see that the average effect of post-materialist values is positive at high levels of 
QoG (as countries pass the score 0.8 on the ICRG indicator). With a margins plot we could see if 
the effect of green values gets stronger visually, and if the effect is negative at low levels of QoG. 
From the interpretation of model estimates, the results are similar to the findings of Svallfors (2013) 
on the effect of egalitarian values on support for higher taxes and spending, showing that a similar 
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theoretical reasoning can be applied in the environmental domain. People with egalitarian values, or 
as in this case green values, living in low QoG societies are generally not willing to support higher 
taxes for environmental protection. The same interaction was not found when using political trust as 
part of the interaction term, which indicates that perceived government quality is what matters here 
and not political trust.  
In the discussion on the operationalization of QoG, it was suggested that perceived QoG, that is, 
individuals’ perceptions of QoG, could be captured using political trust measured on the individual 
level or ICRG’s indicator of QoG on the country level. From the results of this study, looking at the 
interaction effects, political trust does not seem to capture people’s perceptions of government qual-
ity. When exploring the contingent effect of values, only the interaction term including QoG was 
statistically significant. Exploring the contingent effect of social trust, only the interaction term in-
cluding political trust was statistically significant. Political trust appears to capture trust in implement-
ing institutions, which does not necessarily translate into trust in their fair, efficient and impartial 
performance. As has been suggested, people can have trust in corrupt institutions as well. There is 
also a possibility that there is less statistical power in ICRG’s indicator of QoG than in political trust, 
due to fewer units – all individuals within one country are assigned the same country mean, resulting 
in less variation. This could explain the significant interaction effect between political trust and social 
trust, but it does not explain the significant interaction effect between QoG and values. In the latter 
case, the strong correlation between QoG and economic development could be an underlying factor 
behind the significant interaction. Therefore, both interactions should be interpreted with caution.              
A significant interaction between values and QoG was not found in the ISSP dataset, however. This 
is also something that we can only speculate about. One reason could be the relatively bigger dataset 
from the WVS. Sometimes it is possible that we find a significant effect simply because we have a 
large enough dataset. The ISSP dataset is smaller, containing fewer groups on the country level and 
fewer individuals, and consequently has less variation. Investigating the interaction effect between 
values and QoG in other datasets, could confirm whether there in fact is a significant interaction 
effect. From the results of this study, there appears to be an interaction between people’s post-mate-
rialist values and the quality of government institutions. Given the results of the WVS data, QoG is 
what converts values into support for green taxes – at low levels of QoG post-materialist values have 
a negative effect. This can be explained as people with green values, who are more concerned with 
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environmental problems, not wanting to provide corrupt and inefficient public institutions with ad-
ditional resources that could end up being used on polluting activities instead of environmental pro-
tection.      
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to investigate potential interaction effects between individual- and country-
level variables to explain public support for environmental taxes internationally. The research ques-
tion asked was: Do the effects of values and social trust on public support for environmental taxes 
vary depending on country context? Specifically, the aim was to explore the interactions between 
perceived QoG and social trust and environmental values respectively and, additionally, to see 
whether different operationalizations of the main variables of interest will affect the results. 
From the analyses, we can conclude that there are no major differences in results when using alter-
native operationalizations. The effects of political and social trust are rather constant both across 
countries and datasets, and political trust is a relatively stronger predictor of public support for green 
taxes. The random effects of both social trust and values are not as large as we would have expected, 
given the varying levels of QoG across countries and the assumed interaction effects. QoG was found 
to be a statistically significant moderator of the relationship between values and public support for 
green taxes in the WVS dataset. As was theorized, green values have a stronger effect at high levels 
of QoG. On the other hand, QoG was not found to moderate the relationship between social trust 
and public support for green taxes. Here, the level of political trust acts as a moderator instead. Thus, 
the results of the study provide some support for that the effect of values depends on country con-
text, whereas the effect of social trust appears to depend on political trust on the individual level 
instead.   
The results from the analyses of the ISSP and WVS data were, however, conflicting. While a positive 
relationship between the effects of political and social trust on the dependent variable was found with 
the ISSP data, a negative relationship was found with the WVS data. Since a significant relationship 
between values and QoG was not found in the ISSP data, both these relationships need to be further 
investigated in future research. Using better measures of the main variables, including the dependent 
variable, trust and values, and testing the interactions that were found in this paper on other datasets 
could confirm or disentangle the true effects. Given the results of this study, the direct effects of 
QoG and economic development on public support for green taxes also need further investigation. 
QoG was not found to be a statistically significant predictor on its own using WVS data, which was 
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unexpected provided that theory predicts that QoG produces higher political and social trust. Real 
GDP per capita was found to have a negative effect in the WVS data, but no significant effect was 
found in the ISSP data. A future task, that would require high methodological skills and innovative 
techniques, is to try to disentangle the effects of QoG and economic development on environmental 
tax support.  
From a theoretical and empirical point of view, further research on interactions between both indi-
vidual- and country-level variables needs to be conducted to bring a clearer view of what the exact 
interactions look like. In this paper, the interaction between social and political trust and the interac-
tion between QoG and values seem to differ depending on the country sample – because of its size 
or the countries included. It is also possible that interactions between other variables on the individual 
and country level exist, and these are encouraged to be explored. This study has only provided the 
first contribution, which will hopefully also trigger more in-depth studies of interactions in this area, 
using other methodological approaches. Looking at other environmental policy tools, in a similar way 
that support for green taxes was explored in this paper, can bring more insights into public support 
for climate policies in general.    
In order for implementation of environmental taxes to be successful, public support is needed. From 
the results of this study, a few indications are provided that could potentially provide for future policy 
recommendations on how to increase public support if future research is able to support some of the 
findings here. In order for green values to have a positive effect, there appears to be a need for high 
QoG, since such values might even have a negative effect at low levels of QoG. Hence, as people in 
developing countries acquire more post-materialist values with increased economic development (fol-
lowing Inglehart’s theory) there will be a need for high levels of QoG as well. Regarding social trust, 
the results of this study show that in most countries public support increases as social trust increases, 
but in a few cases the trend is the opposite; public support is lower at higher levels of social trust. 
This was true for two non-Western contexts in the WVS dataset and provides an indication of that 
social trust might not have the expected effect in all countries. Exploring why this is the case is of 
great importance since such countries differ significantly from other countries and might not fit into 
established models. If the positive relationship between social trust and political trust can be sup-
ported, the recommendation would be to build political trust in order to increase the positive effect 
of social trust. There is, however, no one recipe for increasing public support for environmental taxes 
across all country contexts since individual-level relationships vary within countries.  
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Future research should explore the effect of values on public support for green taxes further, since 
the results of this study show that people with grey values can also be supportive of such instruments 
even if they lack pro-environmental values. Why this is the case and at low levels of QoG where 
public institutions are perceived as corrupt and inefficient is an interesting puzzle. Further exploration 
of the relationships found here should be done cross-nationally to confirm large trends. Providing 
recommendations to specific countries on how to successfully implement environmental taxes will, 
nevertheless, require exploration of unique conditions in each country. Generally, we can conclude 
that in countries where social and political trust is high, people are more likely to support green taxes. 
Furthermore, people holding pure post-materialist values (strong green values) are likely to be sup-
portive only at high levels of QoG. 
To make environmental taxes a suitable solution across diverse country contexts, particularly in de-
veloping countries where tax-evasion is likely and often acceptable among the public, there is a need 
to build high QoG, state legitimacy and trust in tax-officials. While green taxes may be relatively 
highly supported in developing countries for various reasons, effective implementation is likely to be 
obstructed due to non-compliance. As such, taxes are perhaps not the best solution to solve first-
order collective action problems in all contexts. Until people are actually willing to accept and pay 
higher taxes for environmental protection (i.e. to comply with imposed taxes), and public aversion is 
much lower than public support54, other environmental policy tools might be more attractive and 
effective in changing people’s non-environmental friendly behavior.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
54 Internationally, aversion towards green taxes is still relatively large compared to public support (see figure 3 and 4, 
Appendix D). Only in a handful of countries, public support is much larger than public aversion, but as was suggested low 
QoG in some of these countries might cause low compliance in practice.  
  48 
REFERENCES 
Abramson, P. (1997). Postmaterialism and environmentalism: A comment on an analysis and a reap-
praisal. Social Science Quarterly 78(1): 21–23.  
Afrobarometer. (2014). Africa's willing taxpayers thwarted by opaque tax systems, corruption. Policy papers 
2014: 7. Aiko, R. & Logan, C. (Eds.) http://afrobarometer.org/publications/pp7-africas-willing-tax-
payers-thwarted-opaque-tax-systems-corruption  
Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P. & Schleifer, A. (2010). Regulation and Distrust. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 125(3): 1015–1049. 
Allison, P.D. (2009). Fixed Effects Regression Models. Los Angeles: SAGE. 
Alm, J. & Torgler, B. (2006). Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in Europe. 
Journal of Economic Psychology 27(2): 224–246. 
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Journal of Economic Literature 
35(3): 1320–1346. 
Bell, R. G. & Russell, C. (2002). Environmental Policy for Developing Countries. Issues in Science and 
Technology 18(3): 63–70. 
Berigan, N. & Irwin K. (2011). Culture, Cooperation, and the General Welfare. Social Psychology Quar-
terly 74(4): 341–360.   
Blackman, A. & Harrington, W. (2000). The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: 
Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution. Journal of Environment and Devel-
opment 9(1): 5–44.   
Bluffstone, R.A. (2003). Environmental Taxes in Developing and Transition Economies. Public Fi-
nance and Management 3(1): 143–175. 
Bollen, K.A. & Barb, K.H. (1981). Pearson’s r and coarsely categorized measures. American Sociological 
Review 46(2): 232–239.  
Brechin, S.R. & Kempton, W. (1997). Beyond Postmaterialist Values: National versus Individual Ex-
planations of Global Environmentalism. Social Science Quarterly 78(1): 16–20.  
Brännlund, R. & Persson, L. (2012). To tax, or not to tax: preferences for climate policy attributes. 
Climate Policy 12(6): 704–721. 
Cherry, T.L., Kallbekken, S. & Kroll, S. (2012). The acceptability of efficiency-enhancing environ-
mental taxes, subsidies and regulation: an experimental investigation. Environmental Science and Policy 
16: 90–96. 
Clinch, J. & Dunne, L. (2006). Environmental tax reform: an assessment of social responses in Ire-
land. Energy Policy 34(8): 950–959. 
Coria, J. and T. Sterner (2010). Tradable Permits in Developing Countries: Evidence from Air Pollu-
tion in Santiago, Chile. Journal of Environment and Development 19(2):145–170.   
  49 
Coria, J., Villegas-Palacio, C. & Cárdenas, J.C. (2011). Why Do Environmental Taxes Work Better in De-
veloped Countries? (Working papers in economics, 2011:521). Gothenburg: Department of Economics, 
School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg.  
Connelly, J., Smith, G., Benson, D. & Saunders, C. (2012). Politics and the Environment: From Theory to 
Practice, 3rd ed. Routledge.  
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology 31(1): 169–193.  
Dahlström, C., Lindvall, J., & Rothstein, B. (2013). Corruption, bureaucratic failure and social policy 
priorities. Political Studies 61(3): 523–542.  
Damania, R. (2002). Environmental controls with corrupt bureaucrats. Environment and Development 
Economics 7(3): 407–427.  
D’Arcy, M. & Nistotskaya, M. (2013). Credible Enforcement before Credible Commitment. Exploring the Im-
portance of Sequencing. (Working Paper Series, 2013:4). Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Insti-
tute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. 
Davis, D.W. (2000). Individual Level Examination of Postmaterialism in the U.S.: Political Tolerance, 
Racial Attitudes, Environmentalism, and Participatory Norms. Political Research Quarterly 53(3): 455–
475.   
de Groot, J.I.M. & Schuitema, G. (2012). Policy characteristics, social norms and the acceptability of 
environmental policies. Environmental Science and Policy 19-20: 100–107.  
Deroubaix, J.-F. & Leveque, F. (2004). The rise and fall of French Ecological Tax Reform: social 
acceptability versus political feasibility in the energy tax implementation process. Energy Policy 34(8): 
940–949. 
de Sardan, O.J.P. (1999). A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies 
37(1): 25–52.  
Dimitrova-Grajzl, V., Graljz, P. & Guse, J.A. (2011). Trust, perceptions of corruption, and demand 
for regulation: Evidence from post-socialist countries. Journal of Socio-Economics 41(3): 292–303.  
Di Tella, R. & MacCulloch, R. (2009). Why doesn’t capitalism flow to poor countries? Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity Spring 2009: 285–321.  
Dixit, A. & Olson, M. (2000). Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase theorem? Journal of 
Public Economics 76(3): 309–335.  
Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P. & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecolog-
ical tax reform in Europe: an introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy 34(8): 895–904. 
Drews, S. & Van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (2015). What explains public support for climate policies? A 
review of empirical and experimental studies. Climate policy 16(7): 855–876.   
Dunlap, R.E. & Mertig, A.G. (1997). Global Environmental Concern: An Anomaly for Postmateri-
alism. Social Science Quarterly 78(1): 24–29.   
  50 
Eagly, A.H. & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
College Publishers.  
Endres, A. & Radke, V. (2012). Economics for environmental studies: a strategic guide to micro- and macroeco-
nomics. Berlin: Springer.   
Eriksson, L., Garvill, J. & Nordlund, A. (2006). Acceptability of travel demand management 
measures: The importance of problem awareness, personal norm, freedom, and fairness. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology 26(1): 15–26. 
Fairbrother, M. (2016). Trust and Public Support for Environmental Protection in Diverse National 
Contexts. Sociological Science 3: 359–382.  
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U. & Gächter, S. (2002). Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the en-
forcement of social norms. Human Nature 13(1): 1–25.  
Feller, A. & Gelman, A. (2015). Hierarchical Models for Causal Effects. In R.A. Scott & S.M. Kosslyn 
(Eds.), Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. New York: Wiley.  
Franzen, A. & Meyer, R. (2010). Environmental attitudes in cross-national perspective: a multilevel 
analysis of the ISSP 1993 and 2000. European Sociological Review 26(2): 219–234. 
Freedom House. (2015). Freedom in the World 2015 – Mali. https://freedomhouse.org/report/free-
dom-world/2015/mali. 
Frey, B. & Torgler, B. (2007). Tax morale and conditional cooperation. Journal of Comparative Economics 
35(1): 136–159. 
Gelissen, J. (2007). Explaining Popular Support for Environmental Protection: A Multilevel Analysis 
of 50 Nations. Environment and Behavior 39(3): 392–415.  
Gintis, H. (2000). Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology 206(2): 169–
179.  
Gintis, H, Bowles, S., Boyd R. & Fehr, E. (2003). Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. Evolution 
and Human Behavior 24(3): 153–172.   
Guo, G. & Zhao, H.X. (2000). Multilevel modeling for binary data. Annual Review of Sociology 26(1): 
441–462. 
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B. & Thöni, C. (2004). Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-economic 
background: survey and experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 55(4): 505–
531. 
Hammar, H. & Jagers, S.C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate 
policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy 5(6): 613–625. 
Hammar, H., Jagers, S.C. & Nordblom, K. (2009). Perceived tax evasion and the importance of trust. 
The Journal of Socio-Economics 38(2): 238–245.  
Hansen, O. & Tol, R.S.J. (2003). A refined Inglehart Index of materialism and postmaterialism. (Working 
Paper FNU-35). Hamburg: Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University.  
  51 
Hansla, A., Gamble, A., Juliusson, A. & Gärling, T. (2008). Psychological Determinants of Attitude 
towards and Willingness to Pay for Green Electricity. Energy Policy 36(2): 768–74.   
Hansla, A., Gärling, T. & Biel, A. (2013). Attitude toward environmental policy measures related to 
value orientation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 43(3): 582–590. 
Harring, N. (2013) Understanding the Effects of Corruption and Political Trust on Willingness to 
Make Economic Sacrifices for Environmental Protection in a Cross-National Perspective. Social Sci-
ence Quarterly 94(3): 660–671 
Harring, N. (2014a). Corruption, inequalities and the perceived effectiveness of economic pro-envi-
ronmental policy instruments: A European cross-national study. Environmental Science & Policy 39: 
119–128.  
Harring, N. (2014b). The Multiple Dilemmas of Environmental Protection: The Effects of Generalized and Polit-
ical Trust on the Acceptance of Environmental Policy Instruments. (Doctoral Thesis, Göteborg Studies in Pol-
itics, 137). Gothenburg: Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg.   
Harring, N. (2016). Reward or Punish? Understanding Preferences toward Economic or Regulatory 
Instruments in a Cross-national Perspective. Political Studies 64(3): 573–592. 
Harring, N. & Jagers, S.C. (2013). Should We Trust in Values? Explaining Public Support for Pro-
Environmental Taxes. Sustainability 5(1): 210–227.  
Harring, N. & Lapuente, V. (2016). Cooperation or Punishment. The Effects of Trust on Government Regulation 
and Taxation (QoG Working Paper Series, 2016:8). Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Insti-
tute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg.  
Hasty, J. (2005). The Pleasures of Corruption: Desire and Discipline in Ghanaian Political Culture. 
Cultural Anthropology 20(2): 271–301. 
Hetherington, M.J. (1998). The Political Relevance of Political Trust. The American Political Science Re-
view 92(4): 791–808.  
Hill, J. (2013). Multilevel Models and Causal Inference. In M.A. Scott, J.S. Simonoff & B.D. Marx 
(Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Multilevel Modeling (chapter 12). SAGE.    
Hornback, K. E. (1974). Orbits of Opinion: The Role of Age in the Environmental Movement’s Attentive Public. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University.  
Hox, J. (2002). Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associ-
ates, Inc.  
Hox, J.J., Moerbeek, M. & van de Shoot, R. (2010). Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications, 2ed. 
Routledge.   
Inglehart, R. (1971). The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial 
Societies. American Political Science Review 65(4): 991–1017. 
Inglehart, R. (1977). The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
  52 
Inglehart, R. (1995). Public support for environmental protection: Objective problems and subjective 
values in 43 societies. Political Science and Politics 28(1): 57–71. 
Jagers, S.C. & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: the efficiency and 
legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics 18(2): 218–237.  
Jakobsson, C., Fujii,S. & Gärling, T. (2000). Determinants of private car users’ acceptance of road 
pricing. Transport Policy 7(2): 153–158. 
Janoski, T. (1998). Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional 
and Social Democratic Regimes. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 
Johnson, D.R. & Creech, J.C. (1983). Ordinal Measures in Multiple Indicator Models: A Simulation 
Study of Categorization Error. American Sociological Review 48(3): 398–407.  
Kallbekken, S. (2008). Pigouvian tax illusions: the design of feasible and efficient taxes. In: Pigouvian 
tax schemes: feasibility versus efficiency. PhD thesis, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, 115–
139.  
Kallbekken, S. & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. 
Ecological Economics 69(11): 2183–2190.  
Kallbekken, S., Garcia, J.H. & Korneliussen, K. (2013). Determinants of public support for transport 
taxes. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 58: 67–78.  
Kallbekken, S. & Sælen, H. (2011). Public acceptance for environmental taxes: Self-interest, environ-
mental and distributional concerns. Energy Policy 39(5): 2966–2973. 
Kemmelmeier, M., Krol, G. & Kim, Y.H. (2002). Values, economics, and pro-environmental attitudes 
in 22 societies. Cross-Cultural Research 36(3): 256–285.    
Kidd, Q. & Lee, A. (1997). Postmaterialist values and the environment: A critique and reappraisal. 
Social Science Quarterly 78(1): 1–15.  
Kollmann, A. & Reichl, J. (2013). How trust in governments influences the acceptance of environ-
mental taxes. In F. Schneider, A. Kollmann & J. Reichl (Eds.), Political economy and instruments of envi-
ronmental politics (pp. 53–70). MIT Press.   
Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: Anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of Sociology 24: 183–214.  
Konisky, D., Milyo, J. & Richardson, L. (2008). Environmental Policy Attitudes: Issues, Geographical 
scale, and Political Trust. Social Science Quarterly 89(5): 1066–1085. 
Kreft, I. & de Leeuw, J. (1998). Introducing multilevel modeling. London: SAGE.  
Latinobarometro. (2010). 2010 Report.                                                                         
http://www.asep-sa.org/latinobarometro/LATBD_Latinobarometro_Report_2010.pdf  
Levi, M. & Stoker, L. (2000). Political Trust and Trustworthiness. Annual Review of Political Science 
3: 475–507.  
  53 
Maniates, M.F. (2001). Individualization: Plant a tree, buy a bike, save the world. Global Environmental 
Politics 1(3): 31–52. 
Mansbridge, J. (2014). The role of the state in governing the commons. Environmental Science & Policy 
36: 8–10.   
Matti, S. (2009). Exploring public policy legitimacy: a study of belief-system correspondence in Swedish environmental 
policy. (Doctoral Thesis, Luleå University of Technology). Luleå: Political Science Unit, Luleå Univer-
sity of Technology.  
Micheletti, M. (2003). Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action. Palgrave 
Macmillan: New York, NY, USA. 
Nordlund, A.M. & Garvill, J. (2002). Value Structures behind Proenvironmental Behavior. Environ-
ment and Behavior 34(6): 740–756. 
OECD. (2006). The Political Economy of Environmentally Related Taxes. OECD publishing: Paris. 
http://www.oecd.org/env/toolsevaluation/thepoliticaleconomyofenvironmentallyrelatedtaxes.htm 
OECD. (2010). Taxation, Innovation and the Environment. OECD Publishing: Paris. 
http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/taxationinnovationandtheenvironment.htm 
OECD. (2016). Environmental Taxation. OECD Publishing: Paris 
http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/environmentaltaxation.htm 
Offe, C. (1999). How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens? In M.E. Warren (Ed.), Democracy and Trust 
(pp. 42–97). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Okada, A. (1993). The possibility of cooperation in an n-person prisoners’ dilemma with institutional 
arrangements. Public Choice 77(3): 629–656. 
Okada, A. (2008). The second-order dilemma of public goods and capital accumulation. Public Choice 
135(3/4): 165–182. 
Oliver, P. (1980). Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: Theoretical 
investigations. American Journal of Sociology 85(6): 1356–1375. 
Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University 
Press.  
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. American 
Political Science Review 92(1): 1–22.  
Page, B.I. & Shapiro, R.Y. (1983). Effects of public opinion on policy. American Political Science Review 
77(1): 175–190.  
Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. (1984). Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: A 
strategic analysis. Journal of Public Economics 24(2): 171–193. 
  54 
Persson, A., Rothstein, B. & Teorell, J. (2013). Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corrup-
tion as a Collective Action Problem. Governance 26(3): 449–471.  
Pierce, J.C. (1997). The Hidden Layer of Political Culture: A Comment on "Postmaterialist Values 
and the Environment: A Critique and Reappraisal”. Social Science Quarterly 78(1): 30–35.   
Pierre, J. & Rothstein, B. (2011). Reinventing Weber. The Role of Institutions in Creating Social 
Trust. In T. Christensen and P. Laegreid (Eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Manage-
ment (pp. 405–416). Burlington: Ashgate.  
Pinotti, P. (2011). Trust, regulation, and market failures. Review of Economics and Statistics 94(3): 650–
658.  
Poortinga, W., Steg, L. & Vlek, C. (2004). Values, environmental concern and environmental behav-
ior: a study into household energy use. Environment and Behavior 36(1): 70–93. 
Rothstein, B., Samanni, M. & Teorell, J. (2012). Explaining the welfare state: power resources vs. the 
quality of government. European Political Science Review 4(1): 1–28.  
Rothstein, B. & Stolle, D. (2008). The state and social capital: An institutional theory of generalized 
trust. Comparative Politics 40(4): 441–459.  
Rothstein, B. & Uslaner, E.M. (2005). All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust. World Politics 
58(1): 41–72.  
Rudolph, T.J. & Evans, J. (2005). Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for Government 
Spending. American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 660–671.  
Saijo, T., & Yamato, T. (1999). A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good. 
Journal of Economic Theory 84(2): 227–242. 
Schade, J. & Schlag, B. (2003). Acceptability of urban transport pricing strategies. Transportation Re-
search Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 6(1): 45–61.  
Scholz, J. T., & Lubell, M. (1998). Trust and taxpaying: Testing the heuristic approach to collective 
action. American Journal of Political Science 42(2): 398–417. 
Schuitema, G., Steg, L. & Van Kruining, M. (2011). When Are Transport Pricing Policies Fair and 
Acceptable? Social Justice Research 24(1): 66–84.   
Schultz, P. W. & Zelezny, L. (1999). Values as predictors of environmental attitudes: evidence for 
consistency across 14 countries. Journal of Environmental Psychology 19(3): 255–265.  
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and 
empirical tests in 20 countries. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 25 (pp. 
1–65). San Diego: Academic Press.  
Skill, K. (2008). (Re)Creating Ecological Action Space: Householders’ Activities for Sustainable Development in 
Sweden. (Doctoral Thesis, Linköping Studies in Arts and Science, 449). Linköping: Linköping Univer-
sity Electronic Press.  
  55 
Steg, L., Drejjerink, L. & Abrahamse, W. (2005). Factors influencing the acceptability of energy pol-
icies: A test of VBN theory. Journal of Environmental Psychology 25(4): 415–425. 
Stern, P.C., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G.A. & Kalof, L. (1999). A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of 
Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism. Human Ecology Review 6(2): 81–97.  
Sterner, T. (2012). Fuel Taxes and the Poor: The Distributional Effects of Gasoline Taxation and Their Implica-
tions for Climate Policy. Resources for the Future Press: Washington, DC. 
Svallfors, S (2013). Government quality, egalitarianism, and attitudes to taxes and social spending: a 
European comparison. European Political Science Review 5(3): 363–380.  
Svensson, J. (2005). Eight Questions about Corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3), 19–42. 
Sønderskov, K.M. (2009). Different goods, different effects: exploring the effects of generalized so-
cial trust in large-N collective action. Public Choice 140(1/2): 145–160.  
Thöni, C., Tyran, J.-R. & Wengström, E. (2012). Microfoundations of Social Capital. Journal of Public 
Economics 96(7-8): 635–643.  
Tietenberg, T. (1990). Economic instruments for environmental regulation. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 6(1): 17–33. 
Transparency International. (2008). Overview of corruption and government’s efforts against corruption in Mali. 
http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-government-s-efforts-against-
corruption-in-mali/. 
UNEP. (2004). The Use of Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy: Opportunities and Challenges. Ge-
neva: United Nations Environment Programme. 
Uslaner, E.M. (2003). Tax evasion, trust, and the strong arm of the law. Prepared for a Conference on Tax 
Evasion, Trust, And State Capacity, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland, 17–19 October 
2003.  
Van Liere, K. D. and Dunlap, R. E. (1980). The Social Bases of Environmental Concern: A Review 
of Hypotheses, Explanations and Empirical Evidence. Public Opinion Quarterly 44(2): 181–97.  
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 51(1): 110–116.  
Statistical data files: 
WVS Fifth Wave (2005-2009): WV5_Data_spss_v_2015_04_18.zip retrieved from:  
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp 
ISSP Environment III (2010): ZA5500_v2-0-0.sav retrieved from: 
https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=5500 
The QOG Basic Cross-section data (2015) retrieved from:  
http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogbasicdata  
 
  56 
APPENDIX  
Appendix A: Descriptive statistics 
TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (WVS DATA) 
Variable  Construct  Mean  Min  Max  Standard 
deviation 
Source 
Support for 
higher taxes to 
protect the envi-
ronment (V106) 
“I would agree to an increase in 
taxes if the extra money were used 
to prevent environmental pollution” 
“Strongly disagree”, “Disagree”, 
“Agree”, “Strongly agree” (re-
versed scale) 
2.64 
 
1 4 0.85 World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Political trust 
(V136+V137+V1
41) 
mean-based cen-
tered standard-
ized 
3-item (α = 0.773) index 1: “Confi-
dence in the police”, “Confidence 
in the justice system”, “Confidence 
in the civil services” 
“None at all”, “Not very much”, 
“Quite a lot”, “A great deal” (re-
versed scales) 
2.53 1 4 0.71 World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Political trust 
(V138+V139+V1
40) 
mean-based cen-
tered standard-
ized 
3-item (α = 0.843) index 2: “Confi-
dence in the government”, “Confi-
dence in the political parties”, 
“Confidence in parliament”. 
“None at all”, “Not very much”, 
“Quite a lot”, “A great deal” (re-
versed scales) 
2.25 1 4 0.72 World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Social trust (V47) 
centered stand-
ardized 
“Do you think most people would 
try to take advantage of you if they 
got a chance, or would they try to 
be fair?”  
“Would take advantage”, “Try to be 
fair” 
5.76 1 10 2.55 World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Values (Y002) “If you had to choose, which one of 
the things on this card would you 
say is most important?” 
“And which would be the next most 
important?” 
“Maintaining order in the nation”, 
“Giving people more say in im-
portant government decisions”, 
“Fighting rising prices”, “Protecting 
freedom of speech” 
“Materialist”, “Mixed”, “Post-materi-
alist” (recoded) 
 0 2  World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Household in-
come (V253) 
Income deciles 4.98 1 10 2.31 World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
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Note: Political trust and social trust are presented in uncentered and unstandardized form. Real GDP per capita is presented in 
normal form.  
 
 
 
 
 
Ideology/Party af-
filiation (V114) 
“Far left”, “Center left”, “Center Lib-
eral”, “Conservative right”, “Far 
right” (transformed) 
 1 5  
 
 
 
World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Affected by envi-
ronmental degra-
dation 
(V108+V109+V1
10) 
3-item (α = 0.899) index: 
“Poor air quality”, “Poor water 
quality”, “Poor sewage and sanita-
tion” 
 
“Not serious at all”, “Not very seri-
ous”, “Somewhat serious”, “Very 
serious”  
(reversed scales)  
2.85 1 4 1.05 World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Education (V238) “Incomplete/complete primary 
school”, “Incomplete secondary 
school”, “Complete secondary 
school”, “University-level education 
with/without degree”, “No formal 
education” (transformed) 
 1 5  World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Gender (V235) “Male”, “Female”  0 1  World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Age (V237) “18-29”, “30-45”, “46+”  1 3  World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Employment sta-
tus (V241) 
“Unemployed”, “Employed” (trans-
formed) 
 0 1  World Values 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Current tax-level 
(wdi_taxrev)  
Tax revenues of GDP (%) 17.43 8 28 5.54 Quality of 
Government 
Institute 
(QoG) 
Economic devel-
opment 
(gle_rgdpc) 
Real GDP per capita (2005)  (log 
transformed ) 
17782
.88 
781 55691 14711.21 Quality of 
Government 
Institute 
(QoG) 
Quality of govern-
ment (icrg_qog) 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) Index  
0.62 0 1 0.20 Quality of 
Government 
Institute 
(QoG) 
  58 
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (ISSP DATA)   
Variable Construct  Mean  Min  Max  Standard 
deviation 
Source 
Support for 
higher taxes to 
protect the envi-
ronment 
(V30) 
“How willing would you be to 
pay much higher taxes to pro-
tect the environment?” 
 
“Very unwilling”, “Fairly un-
willing”, “Neither willing nor 
unwilling”, “Fairly willing”, 
“Very willing” (reversed scale) 
2.54 1 5 1.2 International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Political trust 
(V14) 
 
centered 
standardized 
“Most politicians are in poli-
tics only for what they can get 
out of it personally”  
 
“Agree strongly”, “Agree”, 
“Neither agree nor disagree”, 
“Disagree”, “Disagree 
strongly” 
2.46 1 5 1.13 International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Political trust 
(V14+V13) 
 
mean-based 
centered 
standardized 
 
2-item (α = 0.497) index: 
“Most politicians are in poli-
tics only for what they can get 
out of it personally” 
 
“Agree strongly”, “Agree”, 
“Neither agree nor disagree”, 
“Disagree”, “Disagree 
strongly”  
 
“Most of the time we can trust 
in people in government to do 
what is right”  
 
“Disagree strongly”, “Disa-
gree”, “Neither agree nor dis-
agree”, “Agree”, “Agree 
strongly” (reversed scale) 
2.66 1 5 0.91 International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Social trust 
(V11) 
 
Centered 
Standardized 
“Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can 
be trusted, or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with 
people?”  
 
“You can’t be too careful”, 
“Most people can’t be trusted” 
2.88 1 5 1.30 International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Social trust 
(V11+V12)  
 
mean-based 
centered 
2-item (α = 0.703) index:  
 “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can 
be trusted, or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with 
people?” 
 
3.02 1 5 1.12 International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
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standardized 
 
“You can’t be too careful”, 
“Most people can’t be 
trusted”. 
 
“Generally speaking, do you 
think most people would take 
advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try to 
be fair?”  
 
“Most people would try to 
take advantage”, “Most peo-
ple would try to be fair” 
 
Values 
(V9+V10) 
 
“Looking at the list below, 
please tick a box next to the 
one thing you think should be 
[COUNTRY'S] highest prior-
ity, the most important thing it 
should do” 
 
“And which one do you think 
should be COUNTRY'S] next 
highest priority, the second 
most important thing it should 
do” 
 
“Maintain order in the nation”, 
“Give people more say in 
government decisions”, “Fight 
rising prices”, “Protect free-
dom of speech” 
 
“Materialist”, “Mixed”, “Post-
materialist” 
(transformed into one varia-
ble) 
 0 2  International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Personal income 
(Ctry specific: 
rinc) 
Income in US dollars 
(log transformed) 
2167.1
3 
 0 54683
0 
8574.41 International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Ideology/Politi-
cal affiliation 
(PARTY_LR) 
“Far left”, “Center left”, “Cen-
ter Liberal”, “Conservative 
right”, “Far right”  
 1 5  International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Affected by envi-
ronmental deg-
radation (V38) 
“Environmental problems 
have a direct effect on my 
everyday life” 
 
“Disagree strongly”, “Disa-
gree”, “Agree”, “Agree 
strongly”, “Neither agree nor 
disagree” (reversed scale) 
3.15 1 5 1.08 International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
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Note: Political trust and social trust are presented in uncentered and unstandardized form. Real GDP per capita and personal 
income are presented in normal form.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education (DE-
GREE) 
“Lowest formal qualification 
(primary)”, “Intermediate sec-
ondary completed”, “Higher 
secondary completed”, “Uni-
versity degree incom-
plete/completed”, “No formal 
qualification” 
 1 5  International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Age (AGE) “15-29”, “30-45”, “46+”  1 3  International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Gender (SEX) “Male”, “Female”  0 1  International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Employment 
status (WORK) 
“Unemployed”, “Employed” 
(transformed) 
 0 1  International So-
cial Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 
Current tax-level 
(wdi_taxrev) 
Tax revenues of GDP (%) 19.82 9 34 6.71 Quality of Gov-
ernment Institute 
(QoG) 
Economic devel-
opment 
(gle_rgdpc) 
Real GDP per capita (2005)  
(log-transformed) 
26792.
56 
3360 55691 12495.47 Quality of Gov-
ernment Institute 
(QoG) 
Quality of gov-
ernment 
(icrg_qog) 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) Index 
0.75 0 1 0.19 Quality of Gov-
ernment Institute 
(QoG) 
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Appendix B. Results using alternative operationalizations and 
models 
TABLE 1. ALTERNATIVE MODELS USING POLITICAL TRUST INDEX 2 (WVS DATA) 
DV: Public support for 
green taxes 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed effects       
Level 1        
Political trust (index2) .09*** 
(.01) 
.09*** 
(.01)  
.09*** 
(.01) 
.09*** 
(.01) 
.09*** 
(.01) 
.09*** 
(.01) 
Social trust (V47) .03*** 
(.01) 
.02*** 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.03) 
 .03*** 
(.01) 
.02*** 
(.01) 
Values 
Materialista 
 
Post-materialistb  
 
 
-.06*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.02) 
 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.02) 
 
-.06*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.02) 
 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.02) 
 
-.06*** 
(.01) 
-.11 
(.08) 
  
-.05*** 
(.01) 
-.09 
(.08) 
Interaction effects       
Social trust*QoG   .06 
(.05) 
.05 
(.05) 
 
  
Environmental values *QoG     .39** 
(.11) 
.32* 
(.11) 
Individual-level controlsc included excluded included excluded included excluded 
Level 2       
Current tax-level  -.004 
(.01) 
 -.01 
(.01) 
 -.01 
(.01) 
Real GDP per capita (log)  -.15** 
(.05) 
    
QoG  .44 
(.29) 
-.22 
(.21) 
-.20 
(.20) 
-.27 
(.21) 
 
-.24 
(.21) 
Constant 2.64*** 
(.04) 
3.50*** 
(.34) 
2.77*** 
(.13) 
2.65*** 
(.18) 
2.81*** 
(.13)  
2.68*** 
(.18) 
Random effects       
Constant (country intercepts) .06*** 
(.01) 
.04*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
Social trust   .002** .002**   
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*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. Political trust and social trust are standardized and centered 
variables. Real GDP per capita and household income are log-transformed. a: reference category – post-materialist or mixed; b: 
reference category – materialist or mixed; c: see main text. Source: World Values Survey – Fifth Wave (2005-2009) and QOG 
Basic Cross-Section Data 2015.    
 
TABLE 2. ALTERNATIVE MODELS 4 AND 6 USING POLITICAL TRUST INDEX 1 (WVS DATA) 
DV: Public support for green 
taxes 
Model 4 Model 6 
Fixed effects   
Level 1    
Political trust (index1) .08*** 
(.01) 
.08*** 
(.01) 
Social trust (V47) .02* 
(.01) 
.02*** 
(.01) 
Values 
Materialista 
 
Post-materialistb  
 
 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.02) 
 
-.04*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.03) 
Interaction effects   
Social trust*Political trust -.012* 
(.005) 
 
Environmental values*Political 
trust 
 .01 
(.02) 
Individual-level controlsc included included 
Level 2   
Current tax-level -.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
QoG -.18 
(.20) 
-.14 
(.20) 
Constant 2.65*** 
(.18) 
2.61*** 
(.18) 
(.001) (.001) 
Environmental values (post-
materialist) 
    .01 
(.004) 
.01* 
(.004) 
Log likelihood -63967.52 -63583.94 -63924.56 -63550.62 -63924.73 -62867.74 
AIC 63981.52 63631.94 63946.56 63602.62 63946.73 62923.74 
N (Level 1) 26472 26472 26472 26472 26472 26472 
N (Level 2) 32 32  32 32  32 32  
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Random effects   
Constant (country intercepts) .05*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
Social trust .002** 
(.001) 
 
Environmental values 
(post-materialist)  
 .01* 
(.005) 
Log likelihood -63593.86 -63614.81 
AIC 63645.86  63666.81 
N (Level 1) 26472 26472 
N (Level 2) 32 32 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.  ALTERNATIVE MODELS 4 AND 6 USING POLITICAL TRUST INDEX 2 (WVS DATA) 
DV: Public support for green 
taxes 
Model 4 Model 6 
Fixed effects   
Level 1    
Political trust (index2) .09*** 
(.01) 
.09*** 
(.01) 
Social trust (V47) .02* 
(.01) 
.02*** 
(.01) 
Values 
Materialista 
 
Post-materialistb  
 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.02) 
 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.03) 
Interaction effects   
Social trust*Political trust -.011* 
(.005) 
 
Environmental values*Political 
trust 
 .001 
(.01) 
Individual-level controlsc included included 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. Po-
litical trust and social trust are standardized and centered variables. Real 
GDP per capita and household income are log-transformed. a: reference 
category – post-materialist or mixed; b: reference category – materialist or 
mixed; c: see main text. Source: World Values Survey – Fifth Wave 
(2005-2009) and QOG Basic Cross-Section Data 2015.   
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Level 2   
Current tax-level -.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
QoG -.17 
(.20) 
-.13 
(.20) 
Constant 2.64*** 
(.18) 
2.60*** 
(.18) 
Random effects   
Constant (country intercepts) .05*** 
(.01) 
.05*** 
(.01) 
Social trust .002* 
(.001) 
 
Environmental values 
(post-materialist)  
 .01* 
(.005) 
Log likelihood -63546.02 -63560.93 
AIC 63598.02 63612.93 
N (Level 1) 26472 26472 
N (Level 2) 32 32 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4. ALTERNATIVE OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRUST, AND INTER-
ACTION TERMS WITH POLITICAL TRUST (ISSP DATA) 
DV: Public support for 
green taxes 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed effects       
Level 1        
Political trust (V14) .13*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.01) 
.13*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.01) 
.13*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.01) 
Social trust (V11) .16*** 
(.01) 
.14*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.02) 
.13*** 
(.02) 
.16*** 
(.01) 
.14*** 
(.01) 
Values 
Materialista 
 
Post-materialistb  
 
-.18*** 
(.02) 
.29*** 
 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
.20*** 
 
-.18*** 
(.02) 
.29*** 
 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
.19*** 
 
-.17*** 
(.02) 
.31*** 
 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
.21*** 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. Po-
litical trust and social trust are standardized and centered variables. Real 
GDP per capita and household income are log-transformed. a: reference 
category – post-materialist or mixed; b: reference category – materialist or 
mixed; c: see main text. Source: World Values Survey – Fifth Wave 
(2005-2009) and QOG Basic Cross-Section Data 2015.   
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 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.05) (.05) 
Interaction effects       
Social trust*Political trust   .02** 
(.01) 
.02** 
(.01) 
  
Environmental values* 
Political trust 
    .04 
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
Individual-level controlsc excluded included excluded included excluded included 
Level 2       
Current tax-level  -.001 
(.01) 
 -.001 
(.01) 
 .003 
(.01) 
Real GDP per capita (log)  .01 
(.14) 
    
QoG  .66 
(.49) 
 .71* 
(.30) 
 .53 
(.57) 
Constant 2.53*** 
(.05) 
1.59*** 
(.24) 
2.52*** 
(.05) 
1.55*** 
(.24) 
2.53*** 
(.06)  
1.61*** 
(.22) 
Random effects       
Constant (country intercepts) .07** 
(.02) 
.06** 
(.02) 
.07** 
(.02)  
.07** 
(.02) 
.08** 
(.02) 
.07** 
(.02) 
Social trust   .005* 
(.002)  
.006* 
(.002) 
  
Environmental values (post-
materialist) 
    .03 
(.02) 
.04* 
(.02) 
Log likelihood -44835.61 -44108.41 -44788.28 -44051.01 -44818.20 -44083.21 
AIC 44849.61 44162.41 44808.28 44109.01 44838.20 44141.21 
N (Level 1) 14479 14479 14479 14479 14479 14479 
N (Level 2) 26 26 26  26 26  26  
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. Political trust and social trust are standardized and centered 
variables. Real GDP per capita and personal income are log-transformed. a: reference category – post-materialist or mixed; b: 
reference category – materialist or mixed; c: see main text. Source: International Social Survey Programme – Environment III 
2010 and QOG Basic Cross-Section Data 2015.     
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Table 5. Alternative model 2: real GDP per capita vs. QoG (ISSP DATA)  
DV: Public support for green 
taxes 
Model 2 Model 2 
Fixed effects   
Level 1    
Political trust (index) .15*** 
(.01) 
.15*** 
(.01)  
Social trust (index)  .13*** 
(.01) 
.13*** 
(.01) 
Values 
Materialista 
 
Post-materialistb  
 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
.22*** 
(.03) 
 
-.14*** 
(.02) 
.22*** 
(.03)  
Individual-level controlsc included included 
Level 2   
Current tax-level -.002 
(.01) 
.003 
(.01) 
Real GDP per capita  .16 
(.09) 
QoG .66* 
(.30) 
 
 
Constant 1.57*** 
(.24) 
.42 
(.90) 
Random effects   
Constant (country intercepts) .06** 
(.02) 
.07** 
(.02) 
Log likelihood -43998.48 -44000.22 
AIC 44050.48 44052.22 
N (Level 1) 14479 14479 
N (Level 2) 26 26 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. Po-
litical trust and social trust are standardized and centered variables. Real 
GDP per capita and personal income are log-transformed. a: reference cat-
egory – post-materialist or mixed; b: reference category – materialist or 
mixed; c: see main text. Source: International Social Survey Programme 
– Environment III 2010 and QOG Basic Cross-Section Data 2015.     
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Table 6. Model 6 without Mali and Morocco (WVS DATA) 
DV: Public support for green taxes Model 6 
Fixed effects  
Level 1   
Political trust (index1) .08*** 
(.01) 
Social trust (V47)  .02** 
(.01) 
Values 
Materialista 
 
Post-materialistb  
 
-.06*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.02) 
Interaction effect  
Social trust*Political trust  -.01* 
(.004) 
Individual-level controlsc included 
Level 2  
Current tax-level -.01 
(.01) 
QoG .04 
(.17) 
Constant 2.48*** 
(.16) 
Random effects  
Constant (country intercepts) .04*** 
(.01) 
Social trust .001* 
(.001) 
Log likelihood -60979.70 
AIC 61031.70 
N (Level 1) 25474 
N (Level 2) 30 
 
 
 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. Po-
litical trust and social trust are standardized and centered variables. Real 
GDP per capita and household income are log-transformed. a: reference 
category – post-materialist or mixed; b: reference category – materialist or 
mixed; c: see main text. Source: World Values Survey – Fifth Wave 
(2005-2009) and QOG Basic Cross-Section Data 2015.   
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Table 7. Model 6 without Mali (WVS DATA)  
DV: Public support for green taxes Model 6 
Fixed effects  
Level 1   
Political trust (index1) .08*** 
(.01) 
Social trust (V47)  .02*** 
(.01) 
Values 
Materialista 
 
Post-materialistb  
 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
-.08 
(.03) 
Interaction effect  
Environmental values*QoG  .30* 
(.12) 
Individual-level controlsc included 
Level 2  
Current tax-level -.01 
(.01) 
QoG -.08 
(.20) 
Constant 2.53*** 
(.17) 
Random effects  
Constant (country intercepts) .04*** 
(.01) 
Environmental values 
(post-materialist) 
.01* 
(.004) 
Log likelihood -62301.29 
AIC 62353.29 
N (Level 1) 25919 
N (Level 2) 31 
 
 
 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses. Po-
litical trust and social trust are standardized and centered variables. Real 
GDP per capita and household income are log-transformed. a: reference 
category – post-materialist or mixed; b: reference category – materialist or 
mixed; c: see main text. Source: World Values Survey – Fifth Wave 
(2005-2009) and QOG Basic Cross-Section Data 2015.   
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Appendix C. Lists of countries and number of respondents 
TABLE 1. LIST OF COUNTRIES AND NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS PER COUNTRY (WVS DATASET) 
Country Number of respondents Data collection 
Australia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Canada 
Chile 
Cyprus 
Ethiopia 
Finland 
Ghana 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Mali 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Norway 
Peru 
Poland  
Romania 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Sweden 
Switzerland  
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United States 
Uruguay 
Zambia 
1124 
1215 
511 
638 
1289 
566 
910 
1014 
785 
691 
713 
1109 
481 
553 
703 
445 
909 
910 
520 
668 
529 
1911 
1047 
719 
892 
1363 
588 
952 
377 
929 
631 
684 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Total: 32  26374   
Data: World Values Survey – Fifth Wave (2005-2009). 
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TABLE 2. LIST OF COUNTRIES AND NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS PER COUNTRY (ISSP DATASET) 
Country Number of respondents Data collection 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile  
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Philippines 
Russia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Great Britain/United Kingdom 
United States 
447 
826 
462 
525 
276 
104 
495 
795 
445 
930 
171 
169 
596 
889 
157 
666 
376 
281 
1458 
840 
606 
697 
473 
698 
459 
638 
Face-to-face interviews 
Mixed mode 
Face-to-face interviews 
Self-completion questionnaire 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Mixed mode 
Mixed mode 
Self-completion questionnaire 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Self-completion questionnaire 
Mixed mode 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Self-completion questionnaire 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews 
Mixed mode 
Mixed mode 
Total: 26 14479  
Data: International Social Survey Programme – Environment III 2010.  
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Appendix D. Graphs and illustrations of findings 
FIGURE 1. RANDOM EFFECT OF SOCIAL TRUST ACROSS 32 COUNTRIES (WVS DATA) 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction between values, QoG and support – Mali included (WVS data) 
 
Materialist or mixed 
Post-materialist 
 
Data: World Values Survey, Fifth Wave (2005-2009).  
 
Data: World Values Survey, Fifth Wave (2005-2009), and 
QOG Basic Cross-Section Data (2015). 
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FIGURE 3. SUPPORT FOR GREEN TAXES IN NON-WESTERN AND NON-EUROPEAN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES AND EMERGING ECONOMIES (WVS DATA) 
 
Data: World Values Survey, Fifth Wave (2005-2009).   
FIGURE 4. SUPPORT FOR GREEN TAXES IN WESTERN AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (WVS DATA) 
 
Data: World Values Survey, Fifth Wave (2005-2009).  
